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III.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This reply brief is argued in response to issues raised
by Memorial Estates.1 Point I shows that the class decertification
order has not received appellate review.

Point II shows that the

case or controversy at issue on appeal is the class decertification
order.

Point III shows that Schoney did not waive the right to

appeal the class decertification. Point IV shows that Schoney has
standing to represent the class to appeal the decertification
order.

Point V shows that due process requires notice to the

putative class if Schoney is not allowed to appeal decertification.
Point VI shows that Memorial Estates concedes the erroneous nature
of

the

decertification

order.

Point

VII

discusses

the

inappropriateness of sanctions against Schoneyfs counsel.

1

The Utah Rule 23 governing class actions is identical to Fed.
R. Civ. Proc. 23. In the absence of contrary state rulings, Utah
courts frequently follow the reasoning of federal courts
interpreting identical or comparable rules. Wilson v. Lambert, 613
P.2d 765 (Utah 1980). Thus, most of the discussion below will
focus on cases discussing the federal rule which is identical to
the Utah rule.
1
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IV.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT DECIDE
THE ISSUE OF CLASS DECERTIFICATION
A*

Procedural Setting
In 1983, Judge Fishier certified the underlying case as

a class action. Schoney was appointed class representative. App.
Ex. B.

The order expressly stated that the class was certified

under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure "[i]n
order to give res judicata effect to the entire class." Id. at 3.
No notice of the certification was given to the class members.
In 1985, Judge Dee decertified the class.

Again, the

court did not provide notice of the decertification to the class.
See generally statement of facts in Brief of Appellant.
Thus, a "live" issue in the case was and is whether or
not Judge Dee's decertification order was correct.

Judge Dee's

ruling directly affected each putative class member.

However,

because Judge Dee's decertification order was interlocutory, the
plaintiffs had no right to appeal that order until a subsequent
final judgment was entered.

See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437

U.S. 463, 57 L.Ed. 2d 351, 98 S.Ct. 2454 (1978). When Judge Moffat
entered a final judgment (Ex. E of Appellee's Brief), all class
issues, including Judge Dee's decertification order, became ripe
for appeal.
2
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B.

Analysis
Schoneyfs opening brief argues that the Court of Appeals

only ruled on the discovery sanction against Schoney individually,
and that the Court of Appeals never reached

or decided the

correctness of Judge Dee's decertification order.

See Brief of

Appellant, Point III.
Memorial Estates offers contradictory arguments as to
whether or not the class issue received appellate review in Schoney
v. Memorial Estates ("Schoney I"), 790 P.2d 584 (Utah Ct. App.
1990). Brief of Appellant, App. Ex. F.

First, Memorial Estates

argues that the ruling pertained only to Schoney:
Only the actual parties in this case—George
and Erma Schoney, Memorial Estates, Inc., et
al., and their respective successors in
interest—are
bound by the result and
dismissal of this case. The plain and simple
fact in this case is that no one else is bound
by this judgment.
* * *

Suffice it to say that, except for the
plaintiffs' [sic] Schoney, other putative
class members retain their own rights and
claims, if any.
Appellee's Brief at 22-24.
Schoney wholeheartedly agrees.
was against Schoney only.

The discovery sanction

Thus, only Schoney was dismissed from

the case. All other class members retain whatever rights they may
have. This admission by Memorial Estates negates any issue between
the parties as to the extent of the ruling in Schoney I.
3
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See

Fletcher v. Eagle River Memorial Hosp.. Inc.. 456 N.W.2d 788 (Wis.
1990) (discussing the effect of judicial admissions).
In the alternative, Memorial Estates argues: "Plaintiff
has already had her appeal and determination of issues litigated.
. . . The final judgment disposing of all claims and parties was
affirmed."

Appellee's Brief at 17-18.

However, the specific

language of the Schonev I shows that this Court did not rule on the
correctness of Judge Dee's decertification order.

The opinion

plainly states that the ruling is limited to the narrow issue of
whether the trial court erred in granting a default judgment
against Schoney as a discovery sanction:

"We affirm as to the

default judgment and accordingly have no need to consider the
propriety of the summary judgment."
of Appellant, App. Ex. F.

Schoney I at 584.

See Brief

This Court expressly stated that the

ruling did not go beyond the narrow issue addressed in the opinion.
Moreover, the precise question of whether a ruling on
decertification can be inferred from the appellate court's silence
on the issue was recently addressed in American Tierra Corp. v.
Citv of West Jordan. 186 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1992).

In that

case, the class was originally certified, and later decertified.
The Utah Supreme Court ruled that appellate review of the trial
court's class certification order cannot be inferred from the
opinion's silence on the issue.

Jd. at 7 n.4.

4
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American Tierra resolves the precise question at issue in
this appeal. This Court1s ruling on the discovery sanction against
Schoney did not address the class decertification order. The Court
was silent on the issue of class certification.

Under American

Tierra, appellate review of the class certification issue cannot be
inferred from the court's silence. Thus, the class decertification
issue in this case has not yet received appellate review.

The

putative class is entitled to appellate review of the decertification order.
POINT II
THE CASE OR CONTROVERSY IN THIS CASE
IS THE DECERTIFICATION ORDER
Memorial Estates asserts:

"Suffice it to say that,

except for the plaintiffs' [sic] Schoney, other putative class
members retain their own rights and claims, if any."

Appellee's

Brief at 24. One of the important "rights" which the class members
had was to have the case proceed as a class action. Although Judge
Dee decertified the class, class members still had a "right" to
have that ruling reviewed by an appellate court.

This case arises

precisely because an important "right" has been taken away from the
class members.

Specifically, Judge Moffat's ruling

(Ex. C to

Appellee's Brief) has taken away any "right" to have this case
proceed as a class action.

That loss is the controversy at issue.

The basic shortcoming of Memorial Estates' argument is
its assumption that Constitutional concepts work the same way in a
5
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

class context as in a traditional type of suit.
mistakenly asserts:

Memorial Estates

"There was, and is, no case or controversy

before this Court or the trial court.

Absent a pending case and

controversy, plaintiff cannot show that she is an 'aggrieved party1
to the appeal."

Appelleefs Brief at p. 15.

Contrary to Memorial Estates' assertions, this appeal has
nothing to do with the final ruling on Schoney's individual case.
Since the rulings in Mrs. Schoney's case did not go to the merits
of the class issues, the disposition of Schoney's individual case
is nondispositive of the putative class claim.

This appeal is

limited to the order decertifying the class. App. Ex. C. See also
Brief of Appellant, App. Ex. C and D.
The primary "case or controversy" at issue before this
Court is the right of the putative class to appeal decertification.
This is a separate question from the disposition of an individual
plaintiff's separate action on a related claim:
A plaintiff who brings a class action presents
two separate questions, namely the claim on
the merits and the claim of entitlement to
represent the class. Because "the denial of
class certification stands as an adjudication
of one of the issues litigated," [footnote
omitted], the plaintiff may continue to press
the class certification claim after the claim
on the merits terminates, when the plaintiff .
. . continues to advocate vigorously the right
to have a class certified.
2 Newberg on Class Actions § 2.31 at 113-14 (1985)(quoting Deposit
Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 336 (1980)).
6
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Although the putative class claim is separate from the
named plaintiff!s claim when the plaintiff proceeds individually,
appeal of the decertification must await final resolution of the
individual plaintiff's claim.

Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper.

445 U.S. 324, 337 ("We view the denial of class certification as an
example of a procedural ruling, collateral to the merits of a litigation, that is appealable after the entry of final judgment.").
This is because a decertification order is interlocutory and is
generally not immediately appealable.2

During the interlocutory

period, the putative class members "remain parties until a final
determination has been made that the action may not be maintained
as a class action."

Id., 342 (1980) (J. Stevens, concurring).

Only after a final judgment is entered can the decertification
order be appealed.

See, e.g., Coopers & Lvbrand v. Livesay, 437

U.S. 463, 467 (1977) ("An order denying class certification is
subject to effective review after final judgment at the behest of
the named plaintiff or intervening class members.").
The Roper Court further noted:

"[A] decision that is

•final1 for purposes of appeal does not absolutely resolve a case
or controversy until the time for appeal has run."

2

Roper, supra.

The Supreme Court noted in Deposit Guaranty Nat'l Bank v.
Roper that interlocutory appeal for review of certification rulings
might be appropriate in certain circumstances, but not as a matter
of right. 445 U.S. 324, 338 n.8. (1980). In the instant case, no
discretionary interlocutory appeal of the decertification was
taken.
7
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at 334.

Thus, either an appeal of the certification issue or the

running of the time for appeal must occur before the issue of class
certification is finally and fully resolved.3
In summary,

the case or controversy

requirement of

article III of the U.S. Constitution is satisfied as long as a live
controversy concerns the class, and regardless of whether the
representative's individual claims have been settled, mooted, or
dismissed. See, e.g., United States Parole Comm'n v. Geracrhty, 445
U.S. 338 (1980) (holding that an action brought on behalf of a
class does not become moot upon expiration of the named plaintiff's
substantive

claim,

even

though

class

certification

has

been

denied). The decertification controversy here presented is viable.
POINT III
SCHONEY HAS STANDING TO APPEAL DECERTIFICATION ORDER
Memorial Estates suggests that Schoney is seeking "to
pursue her personal claims on behalf of a putative call [sic] when
all of her claims, including the class issues, either [sic] have
been already fully and finally decided against her after appellate

3

Counsel notes that any applicable statute of limitations is
tolled pending resolution of the class certification issue. See
American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah. 414 U.S. 538 (1973)(holding
that commencement of a class action tolls the applicable statute of
limitations as to all class members). See also American Tierra
Corp. v. City of West Jordan, 186 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 at 5-6 (Utah
1992)(holding that the statute of limitations for putative class
claims is tolled during the interlocutory period and throughout the
appeal on the certification issue).
8
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review."

Appellee's Brief at 16-17.

This statement misconstrues

the purpose of Schoney's presence before this Court.
In the instant case, Schoney's individual claims were
finally resolved under a default judgment.

However, the class

claims were not encompassed in the ruling since Schoney's case had
been previously severed from the putative class claim.
Appellant, App. Ex. C.

Brief of

Moreover, the ruling in Schonev I did not

reach the merits, since the case ended with a default judgment.
Id., App. Ex. F. Thus, the question of whether the putative class
claim is a live case or controversy has not been decided and is
properly before this Court.
The standing or personal stake requirement for the class
representative differs from that of the traditional plaintiff.
This simply results from the fact that:

"The class action device

was designed as 'an exception to the usual rule that litigation is
conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only.'"
General Tel. Co. of the S.W. v. Falcon. 457 U.S. 147, 155 (1982).
A "personal stake" in the litigation is required to
ensure that the case involves "sharply presented

issues in a

concrete factual setting and self-interested parties vigorously
advocating opposing positions." Zeidman v. J. Ray McDermott & Co. ,
651 F.2d 1030, 1042 (5th Cir. 1981). As a class action involves an
entire group of individual members, the personal stake requirement
differs in that context. The personal stake requirement functions
9
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in that arena primarily as a test for ensuring adequate representation of class claims.
The test for a personal stake in a class decertification
appeal has two elements. The first element uses the relation-back
doctrine to "examine the named plaintiff's personal stake at the
time the district court denied the motion for class certification."
Rocky v. King, 900 F.2d 864, 868 (5th Cir. 1990).

This element is

particularly important where the claim is inherently transitory in
nature and will expire with the passing of time. Swisher v. Brady.
438 U.S. 204 (1978); Gerstein v. Pucrh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975).

The

requirement is met if the plaintiff had a personal stake in the
claim at the time of decertification.
Schoney satisfies this element since she was the named
plaintiff of the class until it was decertified.

App. Ex. B.

Moreover, she has had a continuing personal stake in the related
litigation pursued since class decertification. The relation-back
doctrine thus pertains to the putative class in this litigation.
Although the putative class claims are still viable, there can be
no more entrants into the plaintiff class since Memorial Estates1
pre-need program has ended and all class claims will expire with
the passing of time.
The second element requires that the plaintiff will
continue to adequately represent the class on appeal.

"So long as

the named plaintiff continues vigorously to advocate the right to
10
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certify a class, the named plaintiff retains a sufficient personal
stake in posing such a procedural challenge."

Rocky v. King,

supra, at 868 (citing United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraqhty, 445
U.S. 388 (1980)).
As Geraahtv explains, this aspect of the personal stake
requirement in the class context often relates more to the efforts
of counsel than the named plaintiff.
analogous to the private attorney

The analysis used is "more
concept than to the type of

interest traditionally thought to satisfy the 'personal stake1
requirement."

445 U.S. at 403.

See also Sosna v. Iowa. 419 U.S.

393, 403 (1975) (stating that mootness of the named plaintiff's
claim

shifts the "focus of examination

from the elements of

justiciability to the ability of the named representative to
•fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class'").

See

generally Yeazell, Collective Litigation as Collective Action. 1989
U. 111. L. Rev. 43 at 54 (discussing private attorney

concept of

class actions).
This aspect of the personal stake requirement has been
expressed as a fiduciary duty imposed on counsel, or on the named
plaintiff,

to

litigation.
Thus,

the

adequately

represent

the

class

interests

in

Soskel v. Texaco. Inc., 94 F.R.D. 201 (DC N.Y. 1982).
courts

will

examine

"whether

plaintiffs'

counsel

continues to pursue the class's interest in a competent, vigorous
manner."

Wilder v. BernsteinP 645 F. Supp. 1292, 1313 (S.D.N.Y.
11
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1986) (citing Sosna v. Iowa, supra. 419 U.S. at 403).

Schoney's

ten-year involvement with the case and ongoing attempts to appeal
the class decertification provide ample evidence of vigorous,
continuing advocacy of the class interests. See Record Index, App.
Ex. C.
Prudential considerations support letting the original
named plaintiff appeal the class decertification when the personal
stake requirement is met, even if the plaintiff lacks a continuing
interest in the traditional sense:
Geraahtv dealt with the ability of a class
plaintiff with a moot claim to appeal the
denial of class certification, and courts may
choose to interpret its holding narrowly,
though a more prudential construction would
support the argument that, given the existence
of a live controversy and the availability of
substitution during all stages of litigation,
absence of a personal stake through mootness
of the representative's claims should not
render the action moot on behalf of the class.
An existing class representative should be
permitted to continue, even if only on an
interim basis pending appeal or until there
has been an opportunity for a substitute class
member with a live claim to intervene. The
continued pursuit of litigation by a plaintiff
who survived initial scrutiny for standing
presumes vigorousness of prosecution [footnote
omitted] and may not be much different from
the plaintiff who forgoes a larger monetary
recovery to bring a class action for lower
statutory damages. The motive of the latter
plaintiff may not be challenged.
Newbera on Class Actions § 2.33 at 123-24.
The courts have been willing to expand the boundaries of
the personal stake requirement to facilitate appeals of class
12
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certification orders. The Supreme Court set the example by ruling
that a plaintiff's economic interest in shifting litigation costs
to other putative class members conferred a sufficient personal
stake to justify that plaintiffs representing the class upon appeal
of the decertification order.

Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper,

445 U.S. 326, 337 (1980).
Rule 23 does not require that the plaintiff be identically situated with the rest of the class in order to represent the
class on appeal.

The commonality requirement:

does not require that all questions of law or
fact raised by the dispute be common; nor does
it establish any quantitative or qualitative
test of commonality. All that can be divined
from the rule itself is that the use of the
plural "questions" suggests that more than one
issue of law or fact must be common to the
class.
7 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1763
(1969). Under Rule 23, the personal stake requirement focuses more
on the plaintiff's ability to protect the interests of the class
than on the plaintiff's "representativeness" of class members.
Schoney "will fairly and adequately protect the interests
of the class" for appealing the decertification order.
Civ. P. 23(a).

She has an adequate personal stake in the claim to

appeal the class decertification.
commitment

Utah R.

Her demonstrated

long-term

to the case and to protecting the putative class

interests demonstrate that she meets the personal stake requirement
for class actions.
13
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POINT IV
SCHONEY DID NOT WAIVE ANY CLASS CLAIMS
Memorial Estates argues that Schoney waived her right to
challenge Judge Dee's decertification order.
[P]laintiff failed to properly preserve the
issue before the Court of Appeals [during
Schonev II when her 39-page [sic] Appellant's
Brief failed to discuss any of the arguments
that she makes today.-- Failure to raise the
issue in the Appellant's Brief and to support
that argument with cogent legal authority
fails to preserve the issue for appellate
review. The decertification issue was waived.
Appellees' Brief at 19-20.
The only reason there was no discussion of the class
decertification issue in Schoneys' brief was because this Court
entered an order prohibiting the Schoneys from enlarging their
brief to address the issue.

Schoney responded to the order by

filing a petition for writ of mandamus with the Utah Supreme Court.
The petition for mandamus specifically argued that the Schoneys
were wrongfully prevented from enlarging their brief to include
arguments regarding Judge Dee's decertification order.

See App.

Ex. D.
The petition for mandamus was ultimately denied. At oral
argument, however, Justice Zimmerman said that the Schoneys were
still free to raise the issue of Judge Dee's decertification order
at oral argument before the Court of Appeals.
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Mr. Wells: . . . the court has ruled later
that we failed to brief, and therefore waived
[the right to appeal the decertification
order.]
That is a judgment of the court,
which it affects the whole class under Rule 23
of the dismissal of class, [sic]
The Court: Have they entered an order saying
you've waived it?
Mr. Wells: By refusing to allow the brief to
be filed, the issue was not raised on the
appeal.
The Court: Did you raise it in your docketing
statement?
Mr. Wells:

It was raised in the docket.

The Court: You can argue it at oral argument
presumably, can't you?
*

*

•

The Court: You still have oral argument. You
had a docketing statement, so you can still
argue it, which means that everything is
presently sort of in coed [sic] down there.
Oral Arguments from Electronic Tapes at 4, 6 (App. Ex. E).
Schoney's followed Justice Zimmerman's instructions. The
issue of class decertification was argued at length during oral
argument before this Court.

See Transcript of Electronic Tapes at

14 and 21-24, Case No. 880630-CA, Court of Appeals (1990) (App. Ex.
F).

Those oral arguments were received without objection.
In summary, Schoney never waived the issue.

It was

presented to this Court. However, the Court of Appeals never ruled
on or addressed this issue.

See Point I of this Brief.
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POINT V
DUE PROCESS REQUIRES THAT PUTATIVE CLASS RECEIVE NOTICE
OR THAT SCHONEY BE ALLOWED TO APPEAL DECERTIFICATION
Class

actions

are

entitled

to

special

due

process

considerations because "a judgment in a class action may bind
members of the class who did not receive the kind of notice and
opportunity to be heard as would be required to render them
•parties1 in the traditional sense, provided that their interests
were adequately represented."

Battle v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins.

Co. , 770 F. Supp. 1499, 1544 (N.D. Ala. 1991) (citing Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 808 (1985); Hansberry v.
Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940); and H. Newberg, 3 Newbera on Class Actions
§ 13.41 at 81-82 (1985)).
Contrary to Memorial Estates1 assertion that Schoney has
waived Constitutional issues, Constitutional protections cannot be
waived absent clear and compelling circumstances. Appellee's Brief
at 28.

See Curtis Publ. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).

Rather, Schoney has now raised a due process issue because it has
now arisen as a result of the District Court's denial of the
putative class's right to appeal decertification.

See Minute

Entry, Brief of Appellant, App. Ex. G.
The Supreme Court has "observed that notice and an
opportunity

to be heard

[are] fundamental

requisites

of the

constitutional guarantee of procedural due process." Eisen v.
Carlisle. 417 U.S. 156, 174

(1973)(citing Mullane v. Central
16
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Hanover Bank & Trust Co,, 339 U.S. 306 (1950)).
Court

stated,

must

be

"reasonably

This notice, the

calculated,

under

the

circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the
action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections."
Mullane, supra at 314.

The Eisen Court further concluded that:

individual notice to identifiable class
members is not a discretionary consideration
to be waived in a particular case. It is,
rather, an unambiguous requirement of Rule 23.
As the Advisory Committee's Note explained,
the Rule was intended to insure that the
judgment, whether favorable or not, would bind
all class members who did not request
exclusion from the suit. 28 U.S.C. App. pp.
7765, 7768.
Eisen, supra at 176.

The Court explained that "Rule 23 speaks to

notice as well as to adequacy of representation and requires that
both be provided."

Id.

This Court has recently emphasized the importance of
notice in class actions:
Notice to absent members of a plaintiff class,
and an opportunity for them to disassociate
themselves from the class, are critical
requirements for maintenance of a class
action, requirements founded in the federally
guaranteed right of the absent class members
to due process of law. [citations omitted] A
class action adjudicates the rights of persons
who ordinarily are not actively involved in
the litigation or aware of specific actions
taken in it. Because of this fact, the court
assumes some responsibility to protect the
interests of the absent class members.
Workman v. Naale Constr., Inc., 802 P.2d 749 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)
(citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts. 742 U.S. 797 (1985); In
17
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re Temple, 841 F.2d 1269 (11th Cir. 1988); and Wehner v. Svntex
Corp,, 117 F.R.D. 641, 645 (N.D. Cal. 1987)).
Due

process

generally

requires

that

notice

and

an

opportunity to be heard must be given to any party whose liberty or
property interests may be adversely affected by legal proceedings.
Tulsa Professional Collection Serv. v. Pope. 485 U.S. 478 (1988)
(citing U.S. Const, amend. V). This requirement is stressed by the
open courts provision of the Utah Constitution.

Utah Const, art.

1, § 11. The requirement for notice and an opportunity to be heard
also underlies Rule 24(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
which grants a party the right to intervene "when an applicant's
claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact
in common."

This rule recognizes the right of persons to become

involved in litigation affecting them.
The damages to the putative

class

include property

interests. The claim involves relatively modest levels of monetary
damages incurred by a considerable number of individuals.

The

limited monetary value of individual damages incurred effectively
preclude the putative class members from litigating their claims
separately. The decertification order thus operates, in effect, as
a de facto ruling against the members' opportunity to litigate
their claims.
Memorial Estates misleadingly suggests that individual
class members are still free to litigate their claims.
18
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Although

their claims may be viable, their ability to litigate these claims
is limited by monetary constraints. The limited damages which each
individual can recover limits the feasibility of separate legal
challenges.
interests.

Thus, a class action is suitable to protect their
See

Calif ano

v.

Yamasaki,

442

U.S.

682,

701

(1979)(noting that the fact that each separate claim has little
monetary value is a factor favoring class treatment).
The claim on its face presents a typical class setting,
involving "the often subtle operation of classwide injuries, the
sophistication of corporate defendants, and the victimization of
small claimants." 2 Newbera on Class Actions § 2.33 at 122 (1985).
The putative class is primarily composed of elderly persons, a
category of citizens which are too often victimized in unscrupulous
dealings.

They are prime targets for the kinds of schemes for

which class actions provide an ideal means of redress.
Furthermore, many individual claimants are unable to
pursue their claims except as a class due to the applicable statute
of limitations.

Whereas the statute is tolled pending final

determination of the class status, many individual claimants, if
the right to appeal the class determination is not recognized, are
unable to proceed. They will be denied due process because certain
class members may have been awaiting a final order before appealing
the class decertification.
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The notice requirements under Rule 23 have been limited
by the courts in certain circumstances.

Memorial Estates has

briefed this point quite trenchantly. Appellee's Brief, Point II.
However, the limitations which some cases impose on Rule 23 notice
provisions do not limit the courts' duty to ensure basic due
process.
Memorial Estates' recitation of cases limiting Rule 23
notice requirements erroneously suggests that they govern this
case.

For example, Memorial Estates quotes Larenzano v. Texaco,

Inc., 14 F.R. Serv.2d 679 (S.D. N.Y. 1971).

The quoted language

pertains only to cases where "it has been clearly demonstrated that
the action is without merit and should be dismissed for failure to
state a claim."
Schoney's

Quoted in Appellee's Brief at 27.

Although

individual claim was dismissed, her claim had been

severed from the class claim.

Further, since Schoney I reached

only the discovery sanction, it did not reach the merits of the
underlying claim.

The reasoning of Larenzano does not apply to

this case because merits of the class claim have neither been
considered nor dismissed.
In summary, due process requires either that Schoney be
allowed to appeal the decertification order, or that notice be
given to the putative class to permit a substitute class representative to come forward to appeal the decertification order. If
this Court denies to class members these protections, the putative
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class will be effectively denied its day in court.

Such a denial

violates due process guarantees.
POINT VI
MEMORIAL ESTATES CONCEDES THAT JUDGE DEE
ERRED BY DECERTIFYING THE CLASS
This case really presents a two-step analysis. Step one
is to determine whether Judge Dee's decertification order is now
ripe for appellate review.
and III.

See Brief of Appellant, Points I, II

Step two is to actually review Judge Dee's decertifi-

cation order.

See id., Point IV.

Memorial Estates has devoted
challenge of step one.

its entire brief to a

That is, Memorial Estates argues, exclu-

sively, that Judge Dee's decertification order should not be
reviewed.

However, Memorial Estates has said nothing at all about

step two. Nowhere does Memorial Estates argue that Judge Dee acted
correctly

by decertifying

the class.

Specifically,

Memorial

Estates has not responded to Point IV of the Brief of Appellant.
By failing to respond to step two, Memorial Estates has
essentially admitted the point.

Generally, a party's failure to

address debatable issues in an answering brief constitutes a
confession of reversible error.

A confession of reversible error

takes its most extreme form when an appellee fails to file a
responsive brief.
1969).

Harrison v. Harrison. 462 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah

On a lesser scale, a confession as to a particular point
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results from an appellees' failure to address debatable issues in
the brief.
waived."

"Arguments not fully developed on appeal are deemed
Lilley v. Johns-Manville Corp., 596 A. 2d 203, 207 n.2

(Pa. Super. 1991)(citing Cosner v. United Penn. Bank, 517 A.2d 1337
(1986)).
Thus, Memorial Estates, though arguing that Schoney has
no right to appeal the decertification, apparently concedes that
the decertification was improper.

Memorial Estates offered no

statement of law or fact to counter Schoneyfs arguments that the
decertification order was erroneous.

Memorial Estates therefore

must be deemed to agree with Schoney that the order was wrong.
POINT VII
SANCTIONS AGAINST SCHONEY SHOULD BE REVERSED
As the foregoing analysis amply demonstrates, Schoney has
a valid basis for appealing the class decertification. Her counsel
also has a fiduciary duty to protect the interests of the class.
Soskel v. Texaco, Inc., 94 F.R.D. 201 (D.C. N.Y. 1982).

The trial

court apparently misunderstood the basis of Schoney^s attempts to
appeal the class decertification when it imposed Rule 11 sanctions
upon Schoney's counsel. Incredibly, Memorial Estates seeks further
sanctions imposed, and asks this Court to uphold tfce trial court's
conduct.

Appellee's Brief, Point III.
While the procedural and Constitutional issues presented

by this appeal may be complicated, they do not lack a genuine legal
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or factual basis. Memorial Estates1 applause of the trial court's
sanctions and request for further sanctions is itself a meritless
position.
This Court should uphold the rights of the class to
appeal the decertification order.

This Court should deny further

sanctions against Schoney and her counsel. As this Court recently
admonished:

"The 'sanction' for bringing a frivolous appeal is

applied only in egregious cases,

'lest there be an improper

chilling of the right to appeal erroneous lower court rulings.1"
Mauqhan v. Mauqhan, 770 P.2d 156, 162 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (quoting
Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365, 369 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)).
The instant case involves a valid right of appeal and
certainly does not fit the model of egregious violations which
would warrant further sanctions.

This Court should reverse the

trial court's impositions of Rule 11 sanctions against Schoney's
counsel.

Only thus can the right of the putative class to appeal

the decertification order be protected.
V.
CONCLUSION
The putative class has a right to appeal the decertification order.

That order has not yet received appellate review.

Either Schoney or another class representative should be
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allowed the opportunity to appeal decertification on behalf of the
class. Otherwise, the putative class will be denied due process of
law.
DATED this K)

day of

Lt/nr~

1992,

ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff

ROBERT J. DEBRY,
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A r t II, § 2

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

be increased nor diminished during the Period for
which he shall have been elected, and he shall not
receive within the Period any other Emolument from
the United States, or any of them.
[8.] Before he enter on the Execution of his Office,
he shall take the following Oath or Affirmation: — "I
do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully
execute the Office of President of the United States,
and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect
and defend the Constitution of the United States."
Sec. 2. [Commander-in-Chief — Pardons —
Treaties — Appointment of officers.]
[1.] The President shall be Commander in Chief of
the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the
Militia of the several States, when called into the
actual Service of the United States; he may require
the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in
each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject
relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and
he shall have power to grant Reprieves and Pardons
for Offenses against the United States, except in
Cases of Impeachment.
[2.] He shall have Power, by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur, and
he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors,
other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United
States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise
provided for, and which shall be established by Law:
but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment
of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the
President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads
of Departments.
[3.] The President shall have Power to fill up all
Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the
Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire
at the End of their next Session.
Sec. 3. [Miscellaneous powers and duties.]
He shall from time to time give to the Congress
Information of the State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he
shall judge necessary and expedient; he may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene both Houses, or either of them, and in Case of Disagreement between
them, with Respect to the Time of Adjournment, he
may adjourn them to such Time as he shall think
proper; he shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers; he shall take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed, and shall Commission all the Officers of the United States.
Sec. 4. [Impeachment]
The President, Vice President and all civil Officers
of the United States, shall be removed from Office on
Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.
ARTICLE i n
[JUDICIAL
DEPARTMENT]
Section
1. [Judicial power.]
2. [Extent of judicial power — Supreme Court —
Trial and places of trial.]
3. [Treason, proof and punishment.]
Sec. 1. [Judicial power.]

444

The judicial Power of the United States, shall be
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior
Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and
inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good
Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their
Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.
Sec. 2. [Extent of judicial power — Supreme
Court — Trial and places of trial]
[1.] The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the
Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under their Authority;—to all
Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers
and Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime
Jurisdiction;—to Controversies to which the United
States shall be a Party;—to Controversies between
two or more States;—[between a State and Citizens of
another State;]—between Citizens of different
States,—between Citizens of the same State claiming
Lands under Grants of different States, [and between
a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States,
Citizens or Subjects.]
[2.] In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State
shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original
Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned,
the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction,
both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and
under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.
[3.] The Trial of ail Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be
held in the State where the said Crimes shall have
been committed; but when not committed within any
State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the
Congress may by Law have directed.
Sec. 3. [Treason, proof and punishment.]
[1.] Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering
to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No
Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the
Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or
on Confession in open Court.
[2.] The Congress shall have Power to declare the
Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason
shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except
during the Life of the Person attainted.
ARTICLE IV
[STATE AND
TERRITORIAL RELATIONS]
Section
1. [Full faith and credit to records and judicial proceedings of states.]
2. [Privileges and immunities — Fugitives from justice and service.]
3. [Admission of states — Rules and regulations respecting the territory and property of
the United States.]
4. [Guaranty of republican form of government and
against invasion.]
Sec. 1. [Full faith and credit to records and judicial proceedings of states.]
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State
to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings
of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts,
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Amend, i l l

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

446

AMENDMENT HI

AMENDMENT X

[Quartering soldiers.]
No Soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in
any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in
time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.

[Powers reserved to states or people.]
The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.

AMENDMENT IV

AMENDMENT XI

[Unreasonable searches and seizures.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.

[Suits against states — Restriction of judicial
power.]
The judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State.

AMENDMENT V

AMENDMENT XII

[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning —
Due process of law and just compensation
clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation.

[Election of President and Vice-President]
The Electors shall meet in their respective states,
and vote by ballot for President and Vice-President,
one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of
the same state with themselves; they shall name in
their ballots the person voted for as President, and in
distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of all persons
voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as
Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each,
which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit
sealed to the seat of the Government of the United
States, directed to the President of the Senate;—The
President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the
Senate and House of Representatives, open all the
certificates and the votes shall then be counted;—The
person having the greatest number of votes for President, shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed; and
if no person have such majority, then from the persons having the highest numbers not exceeding three
on the list of those voted for as President, the House
of Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the President, the
votes shall be taken by states, the representation
from each state having one vote; a quorum for this
purpose shall consist of a member or members from
two-thirds of the states, and a majority of all the
states shall be necessary to a choice. And if the House
of Representatives shall not choose a President whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, before the fourth day of March next following, then the
Vice-President shall act as President, as in the case of
the death or other constitutional disability of the
President.—The person having the greatest number
of votes as Vice-President, shall be the Vice-President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed, and if no person have a
majority, then from the two highest numbers on the
list, the Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a
quorum for the purpose shall consist of two-thirds of
the whole number of Senators, and a majority of the
whole number shall be necessary to a choice. But no
person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be eligible to that of Vice-President of the
United States.

AMENDMENT VI
[Rights of accused.]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence.
AMENDMENT VH
[Trial by jury in civil cases.]
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by
jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury,
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the
United States, than according to the rules of the common law.
AMENDMENT V m
[Bail — Punishment]
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted.
AMENDMENT IX
[Rights retained by people.]
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people.

AMENDMENT X1H
Section
1. [Slavery prohibited.]
2. [Power to enforce amendment.]

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

401

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
PREAMBLE
Article
I Declaration of Rights.
II State Boundaries.
III. Ordinance.
IV. Elections and Right of Suffrage.
V. Distribution of Powers.
VI. Legislative Department.
VII. Executive Department.
VIII. Judicial Department.
IX. Congressional and Legislative Apportionment.
X. Education.
XI Counties, Cities and Towns.
XII Corporations.
XIII. Revenue and Taxation.
XIV. Public Debt.
XV. Militia.
XVI Labor.
XVII Water Rights.
XVIII. Forestry.
XIX. Public Buildings and State Institutions.
XX. Public Lands.
XXI. Salaries.
XXII. Miscellaneous.
XXIII Amendment and Revision.
XXIV. Schedule.
PREAMBLE
Grateful to Almighty God for life and liberty, we,
the people of Utah, in order to secure and perpetuate
the principles of free government, do ordain and establish this CONSTITUTION.
1896
ARTICLE I
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
Section
1 (Inherent and inalienable rights.]
2 (AH political power inherent in the people.]
3. (Utah inseparable from the Union.]
4. (Religious liberty — No property qualification to
vote or hold office.]
5 (Habeas corpus ]
6. (Right to bear arms.]
7. |Due process of law.]
8. |Offen8es bailable.]
9 (Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punishments.]
10. ITrial by jury.J
11 (Courts open — Redress of injuries.]
12. IRights of accused persons.]
13. (Prosecution by information or indictment —
Grand jury.]
14. (Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of
warrant.]
15 (Freedom of speech and of the press — Libel.]
16. (No imprisonment for debt — Exception.]
17. (Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.]
18. (Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impairing
contracts.)
19 (Treason defined — Proof.]
20. |Military subordinate to the civil power.]
21 (Slavery forbidden.)
22 (Private property for public use.)
23. (Irrevocable franchises forbidden.]

Section
24. | Uniform operation of laws.]
25. (Rights retained by people.]
26. (Provisions mandatory and prohibitory.]
27. [Fundamental rights.]
Section 1. (Inherent and inalienable rights.]
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to
enjoy and defend their lives and liberties; to acquire,
possess and protect property; to worship according to
the dictates of their consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and petition for redress
of grievances; to communicate freely their thoughts
and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that
right.

1896

Sec. 2. [All political power inherent in the people]
All political power is inherent in t h e people; and all
free governments are founded on their authority for
their equal protection and benefit, and they have the
right to alter or reform their government a s t h e public welfare may require.
1896
Sec. 3. [Utah inseparable from t h e Union.)
The State of Utah is a n inseparable part of the
Federal Union and the Constitution of t h e United
States is the supreme law of the land.
1896
Sec. 4. [Religious liberty — N o property qualification to vote or hold office.]
The rights of conscience shall never be infringed.
The State shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; no religious test shall be required as a qualification for any office of public trust or for any vote at
any election; nor shall any person be incompetent as
a witness or juror on account of religious belief or the
absence thereof. There shall be no union of Church
and State, nor shall any church dominate the State or
interfere with its functions. No public money or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or for the support of any ecclesiastical establishment. No property
qualification shall be required of any person to vote,
or hold office, except as provided in this Constitution.
1896

Sec. 5. [Habeas corpus.]
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not
be suspended, unless, in case of rebellion or invasion,
the public safety requires it.
1896
f
Sec. 0. [Right to bear arms.]
The individual right of the people to keep and bear
arms for security and defense of self, family, others,
property, or the state, as well as for other lawful purposes shall not be infringed; but nothing herein shall
prevent the legislature from defining the lawful use
of arms.
ISM
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.)
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.
1896
Sec. 8. [Offenses bailable.]
(1) All persons charged with a crime shall be bailable except:
(a) persons charged with a capital offense
when there is substantial evidence to support the
charge; or
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(b) persons charged with a felony while on probation or parole, or while free on bail awaiting
trial on a previous felony charge, when there is
substantial evidence to support the new felony
charge; or
(c) persons charged with any other crime, designated by statute as one for which bail may be
denied, if there is substantial evidence to support
the charge and the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person would constitute a substantial danger to any other person or
to the community or is likely to flee the jurisdiction of t h e court if released on bail.
(2) Persons convicted of a crime a r e bailable pending appeal only a s prescribed by law.
1988
Sec. 9. [Excessive bail a n d fines — Cruel punishments.]
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines
shall not be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual
punishments be inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor. 1896
Sec. 10. [Trial b y jury.]
In capital cases t h e right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. In courts of general jurisdiction, except in capital cases, a jury shall consist of eight jurors. In courts of inferior jurisdiction a jury shall consist of four jurors. In criminal cases the verdict shall
be unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be
waived unless demanded.
1896
Sec. 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.]
All courts shall be open, and every person, for a n
injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary
delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting
or defending before any tribunal in this State, by
himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a
party.

1896

Sec. 12. IRights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel,
to demand the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his
own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against
him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall
not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a
wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any
person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
1896

Sec. 13. [Prosecution by information or indictment — Grand jury.l
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by
indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after
examination and commitment by a magistrate, unless the examination be waived by the accused with
the consent of the State, or by indictment, with or
without such examination and commitment. The formation of the grand jury and the powers and duties
thereof shall be as prescribed by the Legislature. 1947
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Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden Issuance of warrant.)
The right of the people to be secure in their pei
sons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonabl
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and n
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause su(
ported by oath or affirmation, particularly describin
the place to be searched, and the person or thing to t
seized.
IH«
Sec. 15. [Freedom of speech and of the press Libel.]
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain tl
freedom of speech or of the press. In all criminal pro
ecutions for libel the truth may be given in evident
to the jury; and if it shall appear to the jury that tl
matter charged as libelous is true, and was publish*
with good motives, and for justifiable ends, the pari
shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the ri|;l
to determine the law and the fact.
IP
Sec. 16. (No imprisonment for debt — Excci
tlon.]
There shall be no Imprisonment for debt except
cases of absconding debtors.
ir
Sec. 17. [Elections to be free — Soldiers votint
All elections shall be free, and no power, civil
military, shall at any time interfere to prevent t1
free exercise of the right of suffrage. Soldiers, in tii
of war, may vote at their post of duty, in or out of t
State, under regulations to be prescribed by law. i •
Sec. 18. (Attainder — Ex post facto laws — I*
pairing contracts.]
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law i
pairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed
r
Sec. 19. [Treason defined — Proof.]
Treason against the State shall consist only
levying war against it, or in adhering to its enem
or in giving them aid and comfort. No person shall
convicted of treason unless on the testimony of t
witnesses to the same overt act.
i
Sec. 20. [Military subordinate to the ci
power.]
The military shall be in strict subordination to t
civil power, and no soldier in time of peace, shall
quartered in any house without the consent of i
owner; nor in time of war except in a manner to
prescribed by law.
i
Sec. 21. [Slavery forbidden.]
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, exc
as a punishment for crime, whereof the party si
have been duly convicted, shall exist within t
State.
Sec. 22. [Private property for public use.)
Private property shall not be taken or damaged
public use without just compensation.
Sec. 23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden. 1
No law shall be passed granting irrevocably .
franchise, privilege or immunity.
Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.]
All laws of a general nature shall have unif<
operation.
Sec. 25. [Rights retained by people.]
This enumeration of rights shall not be consti
to impair or deny others retained by the people.

FEDERAL RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
FOR THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURTS
For effective dates, see Rule 86
Rule 23. Class Actions
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may
sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class
is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are
questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of
the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class,
and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class
action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members
of the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual
members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of
conduct for the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class
which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the
other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair
or impede their ability to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final
injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the
class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available
methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The
matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of members of
the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of
1
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separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning
the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class;
(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the
claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.
(c) Determination by Order Whether Class Actions to be Maintained;
Notice; Judgment; Actions Conducted Partially as Class Actions. (1) As
soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a
class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so
maintained. An order under this subdivision may be conditional, and
may be altered or amended before the decision on the merits.
(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the court
shall direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under
the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can
be identified through reasonable effort. The notice shall advise each
member that (A) the court will exclude him from the class if he so
requests by a specified date; (B) the judgment, whether favorable or not,
will include all members who do not request exclusion; and (C) any
member who does not request exclusion may, if he desires, enter an
appearance through his counsel.
(3) The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under
subdivision (b)(1) or (b)(2), whether or not favorable to the class, shall
include and describe those whom the court finds to be members of the
class. The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under
subdivision (b)(3), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include
and specify or describe those to whom the notice provided in subdivision
(c)(2) was directed, and who have not requested exclusion, and whom
the court finds to be members of the class.
(4) When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or maintained as a
class action with respect to particular issues, or (B) a class may be
divided into subclasses and each subclass treated as a class, and the
provisions of this rule shall then be construed and applied accordingly.
(d) Orders in Conduct of Actions. In the conduct of actions to which this
rule applies, the court may make appropriate orders: (1) determining the
course of proceedings or prescribing measures to prevent undue repetition
or complication in the presentation of evidence or argument; (2) requiring,
for the protection of the members of the class or otherwise for the fair
conduct of the action, that notice be given in such manner as the court
may direct to some or all of the members of any step in the action or of
the proposed extent of the judgment, or of the opportunity of members to
signify whether they consider the representation fair and adequate, to
intervene and present claims or defenses, or otherwise to come into the
action; (3) imposing conditions on the representative parties or on intervenors; (4) requiring that the pleadings be amended to eliminate therefrom
allegations as to representation of absent persons, and that the action

Rule 23
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proceed accordingly; (5) dealing with similar procedural matters. The
orders may be combined with an order under Rule 16, and may be altered
or amended as may be desirable from time to time.
(e) Dismissal or Compromise. A class action shall not be dismissed or
compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed
dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such
manner as the court directs.
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES
Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules.
Note to Subdivision (a). This is a substantial restatement of former
Equity Rule 38 (Representatives of Class) as that rule has been
construed. It applies to all actions, whether formerly denominated legal
or equitable. For a general analysis of class actions, effect of judgment,
and requisites of jurisdiction see Moore, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Problems Raised by the Preliminary Draft, 25 Georgetown
L J 551, 570 et scq (1937); Moore and Cohn, Federal Class Actions,
32 111 L Rev 307 (1937); Moore and Cohn, Federal Class ActionsJurisdiction and Effect of Judgment, 32 111 L Rev 555-567 (1938);
Lesar, Class Suits and the Federal Rules, 22 Minn L Rev 34 (1937); cf.
Arnold and James, Cases on Trials, Judgments and Appeals (1936)
175; and see Blume, Jurisdictional Amount in Representative Suits, 15
Minn L Rev 501 (1931).
The general test of former Equity Rule 38 (Representatives of Class)
that the question should be "one of common or general interest to
many persons constituting a class so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court," is a common test. For states
which require the two elements of a common or general interest and
numerous persons, as provided for in former Equity Rule 38, see Del
Ch Rule 113; Fla Comp Gen Laws Ann (Supp, 1936) §4918(7);
Georgia Code (1933) §37-1002, and see English Rules Under the
Judicature Act (The Annual Practice, 1937) O. 16, r. 9. For statutory
provisions providing for class actions when the question is one of
common or general interest or when the parties are numerous, see Ala
Code Ann (Michie, 1928) §5701; 2 Ind Stat Ann (Bums, 1933) §2220; NYCPA (1937) § 195; Wis Stat (1935) §260.12. These statutes
have, however, been uniformly construed as though phrased in the
conjunctive. See Garfein v Stiglitz, 260 Ky 430, 86 SW2d 155 (1935).
The rule adopts the test of former Equity Rule 38, but defines what
constitutes a "common or general interest". Compare with code provisions which make the action dependent upon the propriety of joinder of
the parties. See Blume, The "Common Questions" Principle in the
Code Provision for Representative Suits, 30 Mich L Rev 878 (1932).
For discussion of what constitutes "numerous persons" see Wheaton,
Representative Suits Involving Numerous Litigants, 19 Corn L Q 399
(1934); Note, 36 Harv L Rev 89 (1922).
Clause (1), Joint, Common, or Secondary Right. This clause is illustrated in actions brought by or against representatives of an unincorporated association. See Oster v Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and
3

2
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Terry's Sales, Inc v. Vander Veur, 618 P 2d 29
(Utah 1980).
Taxation.
Complaint by taxpayer to compel two counties to interplead as to which was entitled to
tax as result of apportionment by State Tax
Commission was held insufficient. See Union
Pac. R R v. Summit County, 48 Utah 540, 161
P 463 (1916).

Termination.
—Decision on all issues.
If the action in interpleader accomplishes
the purpose for which the plaintiff instituted it,
it is not necessarily a requisite to its termination that it decide all of the issues between the
adverse claimants. Terry's Sales. Inc. v.
Vander Veur, 618 P 2d 29 (Utah 1980).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 45 Am. Jur. 2d Interpleader
$ 29 et seq
C.J.S. — 48 C J.S Interpleader 8 11.

tion in absence of contract or statute fixing
amount, 57 A L R.3d 475
Key Numbers. — Interpleader «=» 14.

A.L.R. — Amount of attorney's compensa-

t i v e 23. C l a s s a c t i o n s .
(a) P r e r e q u i s i t e s to a c l a s s a c t i o n . One or more members of a class may
sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is
so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4)
the representative parties wiJJ fairly and adequately protect the interests of
the class.
(b) Class a c t i o n s m a i n t a i n a b l e . An action may be maintained as a class
action if the prerequisites of Subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) The prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class would create a risk of:
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class
which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of
the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially
impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; or
(2) The party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class
as a whole; or
(3) The court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available
methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The
matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of members of
the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate
actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the
desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims
in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the
management of a class action.
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(c) D e t e r m i n a t i o n b y o r d e r w h e t h e r class a c t i o n to b e m a i n t a i n e d ;
notice; j u d g m e n t ; a c t i o n s c o n d u c t e d p a r t i a l l y a s c l a s s a c t i o n s .
(1) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought
as a class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be
maintained. An order under this subdivision may be conditional, and may
be altered or amended before the decision on the merits.
(2) In any class action maintained under Subdivision (b)(3), the court
shall direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under
the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be
identified through reasonable effort. The notice shall advise each member
that (A) the court will exclude him from the class if he so requests by a
specified date; (B) the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all
members who do not request exclusion; and (C) any member who does not
request exclusion may, if he desires, enter an appearance through his
counsel.
(3) The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under Subdivision (b)(1) or (b)(2), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include
and describe those whom the court finds to be members of the class. The
judgment in an action maintained as a class action under Subdivision
(b)(3), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and specify or
describe those to whom the notice provided in Subdivision (c)(2) was directed, and who have not requested exclusion, and whom the court finds
to be members of the class.
(4) When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or maintained as a
class action with respect to particular issues, or (B) a class may be divided
into subclasses and each subclass treated as a class, and the provisions of
this rule shall then be construed and applied accordingly.
(d) O r d e r s in c o n d u c t of actions. In the conduct of actions to which this
rule applies, the court may make appropriate orders: (1) determining the
course of proceedings or prescribing measures to prevent undue repetition or
complication in the presentation of evidence or argument; (2) requiring, for
the protection of the members of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of
the action, that notice be given in such manner as the court may direct to
some or all of the members of any step in the action, or of the proposed extent
of the judgment, or of the opportunity of members to signify whether they
consider the representation fair and adequate, to intervene and present claims
or defenses, or otherwise to come into the action; (3) imposing conditions on
the representative parties or on intervenors; (4) requiring that the pleadings
be amended to eliminate therefrom allegations as to representation of absent
persons, and that the action proceed accordingly; (5) dealing with similar
procedural matters. The orders may be combined with an order under Rule 16,
and may be altered or amended as may be desirable from time to time.
(e) Dismissal o r c o m p r o m i s e . A class action shall not be dismissed or
compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed
dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such
manner as the court directs.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is identical
to Rule 23, F R C P .
Cross-References. — Advancement, conduct, and hearing of actions, orders for, reasonable notice, Rule 78

Antidiscrimination Act, $ 34-35-1 et seq
Appearance by attorney, proof of authority,
§ 78-51-33
Capacity to sue or be sued need not be
averred, Rule 9(a)(1).
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Action barred.
—Plaintiffs not shareholders at time of wrongful act.
Class action distinguished.
Action barred.
—Plaintiffs not shareholders at time of
wrongful act.
Shareholders' action against former corporate directors and nlluns for alleged conversion of corporate assets and for breach of fidu-

ciary duties was haired by this rule where the
shareholders did not acquire their stock until
after the events complained of and the shares
did not devolve on them by operation of law.
Noland v. Barton, 741 F.2d 315 (10th Cir.
1984).
Class action distinguished.
Action by corporate shareholders which alleged injury to the corporation only, and not to
them as individuals, was a derivative action
and could not be brought as a class action.
Richardson v. Arizona Fuels Corp., 614 P.2d
636 (Utah 1980).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 19 Am. Jur. 2d Corporations
§ 2250.
C.J.S. - 18 C.J.S. Corporations §§ 564 to
566.
A.L.R. — Communications by corporation as
privileged in stockholders' action, 34 A.L.R.3d
1106.
Allowance of punitive damages in stockholder's derivative action, 67 A.L.R.3d 350.
Application to derivative actions for breach

of fiduciary duty, under § 36(b) of Investment
Company Act of 1940 (15 USC 5 80a-35(b)), of
requirement, stated in Rule 23.1 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure that complaint in derivative actions allege what efforts were made
by shareholders to obtain desired action or reasons for failure to do so, 65 A.L.R. Fed. 542.
Key Numbers. — Corporations «=» 206, 207.

Rule 24. Intervention.
(a) Intervention of right. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute confers an unconditional right
to intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the
property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated
that the disposition of the action may as a practical m a t t e r impair or impede
his ability to protect t h a t interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties.
(b) P e r m i s s i v e intervention. Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute confers a conditional right
to intervene; or (2) when an applicant's claim or defense and the main action
have a question of law or fact in common. When a party to an action relies for
ground of claim or defense upon any s t a t u t e or executive order administered
by a governmental officer or agency or upon any regulation, order, requirement, or agreement issued or made p u r s u a n t to the s t a t u t e or executive order,
the officer or agency upon timely application may be permitted to intervene in
the action. In exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether the
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of
the original parties.
(c) Procedure. A person desiring to intervene shall serve a motion to intervene upon the parties as provided in Rule 5. The motions shall state the
grounds therefor and shall be accompanied by a pleading setting forth the
claim or defense for which intervention is sought.
(Amended effective J a n . 1, 1987.)

Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 24, F R C P .
Cross-Refercnces. — Claims for relief and
defenses, Rule 8.
Fee for filing complaint in intervention,
§§ 78-3-16.5, 78-4-24, 78-6-14.
Form for motion to intervene as defendant,
Form 24.

Rule 24

Misjoinder and nonjoinder of parties, Rule
21.
Necessary joinder of parties, Rule 19.
Parties plaintiff and defendant; capacity,
Rule 17.
Permissive joinder of parties, Rule 20.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Appeal.
—Order denying intervention.
Intervention of right.
—Adverse effect.
Court's disposition of property.
—Insurer.
Uninsured motorist coverage.
Jurisdiction.
—Error by court clerk.
Postjudgment intervention.
—Not allowed.
—Showing required.
Timeliness.
Appeal.
—Order denying intervention.
Order which denies with prejudice an application for intervention is appealable. Tracy v.
University of Utah Hosp., 619 P.2d 340 (Utah
1980).
Intervention of right.
—Adverse effect.
Court's disposition of property.
When the application for intervention is
made timely, this rule permits intervention as
a matter of right when the applicant will be
adversely affected by the trial court's disposition of property. Jenner v. Real Estate Servs.,
659 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1983).

Jurisdiction.
—Error by court clerk.
Court erred in dismissing for failure of jurisdiction a complaint in intervention which court
clerk had erroneously put in different file than
that of the original action, where all the pnrties had notice of the intervention and made no
objection to the presence of intervener's attorney at the trial. Centurian Corp. v. Crippi. 577
P.2d 955 (Utah 1978).
Postjudgment intervention.
—Not allowed.
Undisclosed partner of a purchaser under a
land sale contract was not entitled to intervene
after default judgment had been entered in an
action to declare a forfeiture of the contract
since the undisclosed partner permitted his
partner to assume the role of sole owner of
their interest under the contract and the
known purchaser had been duly served with
notice of default in the contract payments and
for demand for payment and had been duly
served with summons in the forfeiture action.
Jenner v. Real Estate Servs., 659 P.2d 1072
(Utah 1983).

—Insurer.

—Showing required.
Generally, intervention is not permitted after entry of judgment, with exceptions to this
general rule made only upon a strong showing
of entitlement and justification, or such unusual or compelling circumstances as will justify the failure to seek intervention earlier.
Jenner v. Real Estate Servs., 659 P.2d 1072
(Utah 1983).

Uninsured motorist coverage.
Where interests of insurance company providing uninsured motorist coverage would not
be adequately represented in a tot J net ion between its insured as plaintiff and an uninsured
motorist tort-feasor as defendant, insurance
company was entitled to intervene as a party
defendant as of right. Lima v. Chambers, 657
P.2d 279 (Utah 1982).

Timeliness.
Use of the word "timely" in Subdivisions (a)
and (b) requires that the timeliness of the application for intervention be determined under
the facts and circumstances of each particular
case, and in the sound discretion of the court.
Jenner v. Real Estate Servs., 659 P.2d 1072
(Utah 1983); Republic Ins. Group v. Doman,
774 P.2d 1130 (Utah 1989).
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parties shall be designated as "all unknown persons who claim any interest in
the subject matter of the action." Every pleading and other paper filed with
the court shall also state the name, address, telephone number and bar number of any attorney representing the party filing the paper, which information
shall appear in the top left-hand corner of the first page. Every pleading shall
state the name and address of the party for whom it is filed; this information
shall appear in the lower left-hand corner of the last page of the pleading.
(b) Paragraphs; separate statements. All averments of claim or defense
shall be made in numbered paragraphs, the contents of each of which shall be
limited as far as practicable to a statement of a single set of circumstances;
and a paragraph may be referred to by number in all succeeding pleadings.
Each claim founded upon a separate transaction or occurrence and each defense other than denials shall be stated in a separate count or defense whenever a separation facilitates the clear presentation of the matters set forth.
(c) Adoption by reference; exhibits. Statements in a pleading may be
adopted by reference in a different part of the same pleading or in another
pleading, or in any motion. An exhibit to a pleading is a part thereof for all
purposes.
(d) P«pi-r quality, size, style and printing. All pleadings and other papers filed with the court, except printed documents or other exhibits, shall be
typewritten, printed or photocopied in black type on good, white, unglazed
paper of letter size (8V2" x 11"), with a top margin of not less than 2 inches
above any typed material, a left-hand margin of not less than 1 inch, a righthand margin of not less than one-half inch, and a bottom margin of not less
than one-half inch. All typing or printing shall be clearly legible, shall be
double-spaced, except for matters customarily single-spaced or indented, and
shall not be smaller than pica size. Typing or printing shall appear on one side
of the page only.
(e) Signature line. Names shall be typed or printed under all signature
lines, and all signatures shall be made in permanent black or blue ink.
(0 Enforcement by clerk; waiver for pro se parties. The clerk of the
court shall examine all pleadings and other papers filed with the court. If they
are not prepared in conformity with this rule, the clerk shall accept the filing
but may require counsel to substitute properly prepared papers for nonconforming papeis. The clerk or the court may waive the requirements of this
rule for parties appearing pro se. For good cause shown, the court may relieve
any party of any requirement of this rule.
(g) Replacing lost pleadings or papers. If an original pleading or paper
filed in any action or proceeding is lost, the court may, upon motion, with or
without notice, authorize a copy thereof to be filed and used in lieu of the
original.
(Amended effective J a n . 1, 1983; April 1, 1990.)
Advisory Committee Note. — As a general
mailer, Rule 10 deals with the form of papers
filed with the court — both "pleadings" as defined in Rule 7(a) and "other papers filed with
the court," including motions, memoranda, discovery responses, and orders. The changes in
the present rule were promulgated to clarify
ambiguities in the prior rule and to address
specific problems encountered by the courts.
Paragraphs <b>, (c) and (e) of the rule were not

changed, except that paragraph (e) was redesignated as (g) and new paragraphs (e) and (0
were added
Paragraph (a). This paragraph specifies requirements for captions in every paper filed
with the court. In addition to the other requirements, the caption must contain the name of
the judge to whom the case is assigned, if the
judge's name is known at the time the paper is
filed. In the top left-hand corner 6f the first

page, each paper must state identifying information concerning the attorney representing
the party filing the paper. Finally, every pleading must state the name and current address of
the party for whom it is filed; this information
should appear on the lower left-hand corner of
the last page. This information need not be set
forth in papers other than pleadings.
Paragraph (d). The changes in this paragraph make it clear that papers filed with the
court must be "typewritten, printed or photocopied in black type" The Advisory Committee
considered suggestions from different groups
that so-called "dot matrix" printing be specifically allowed or specifically prohibited. The
Advisory Committee, however, settled on the
requirements that "typing or printing shall be
clearly legible ... and shall not be smaller than
pica size." If typing or printing on papers filed
with the court complies with these standards,
the papers should not be deemed to violate the
rule merely because they were prepared in a
dot matrix printer. As currently written, this
paragraph also removes any confusion concerning the top margin and left mnrgin requirements (now 2 inches and 1 inch respectively),
and this paragraph imposes new requirements
for right and bottom margins (both one-half
inch).

Rule 11

Paragraph (e). This paragraph, which is an
addition to the rule, requires typed signature
lines and signatures in permanent black or
blue ink.
Paragraph (f). The changes in this paragraph make it clear that the clerk must accept
all papers for filing, even though they may violate the rule, but the clerk may require counsel
to substitute conforming for nonconforming papers. The clerk is given discretion to waive requirements of the rule for parties who are not
represented by counsel; for good cause shown,
the court may relieve parties of the obligation
to comply with the rule or any part of it.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment added "and other papers" to the rule
catchline and added similar language in two
places in Subdivision (a); in Subdivision (a),
added the Inst phrase in (ho subdivision heading, added the last two phrases in the first sentence, deleting "and a designation as in Rule
(7)(a)," added the last two sentences, and made
stylistic changes; rewrote Subdivision (d);
added Subdivisions (e) and (0; and redesignated former Subdivision (e) as Subdivision
<gl.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 10, F R.C.P.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Exhibits.
—Use as pleadings.
Cited.

of a pleading to clarify or explain the same, an
exhibit to a pleading cannot serve the purpose
of supplying necessary material averments nor
can the content of the exhibit be taken as part
of the allegations of the pleading itself. Girard
v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245 (Utah 1983).

Exhibits.
Cited in State ex rel. Cannon v. Leary, 646
—Use as pleadings.
P.2d 727 (Utah 1982).
While an exhibit may be considered as a part
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 61A Am. Jur. 2d Pleading
§§ 23 to 56, 69, 117.
C.J.S. — 71 C.J.S. Pleading §§ 5, 9, 63 to 98,
371 to 375, 418.
A.L.R. — Propriety of attaching photographs to a pleading, 33 A.L.R.3d 322.

Propriety and effect of use of fictitious name
of plaintiff in federal court, 97 A.L.R. Fed. 369.
Key Numbers. — Pleading *=» 4. 13, 15, 38'/ 2
to 75, 307 to 312, 340

Rule 11. Signing of pleadings, motions, and other papers;
sanctions.
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name
who is duly licensed to practice in the state of Utah. The attorney's address
also shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign
his pleading, motion, or other paper and state his address. Except when other37

36
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wise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or
accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of an answer
under oath must be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses or of one
witness sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished. The signature
of an attorney or party constitutes a certification by him that he has read the
pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and
is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless
increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is not
signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is
called to the attention of the pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion, or other
paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own
initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or
both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other
party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of
the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable
attorney's fee.
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985.)
C o m p i l e r ' s N o t e s . — This rule ia substantially similar to Rule 11, F.R.C.P.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

ranted by existing law" does not require him to
obtain a favorable expert medical opinion before filing a medical malpractice action.
Deschamps v. Pulley, 784 P.2d 471 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989).

Amendment of complaint.
Nature of duty imposed.
Reasonable inquiry.
Violation.
—Question of law.
—Sanctions.
—Standard
Cited.

Violation.

A m e n d m e n t of c o m p l a i n t .
Amendment by an attorney of the facts
stated in a complaint was sufficient to establish those facts as they would have been by a
verified complaint before the changes made by
this rule making verification unnecessary,
('alder v. Third Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. Salt
Lake County, 2 Utah 2d 309, 273 P.2d 168
(1954)
N a t u r e of d u t y i m p o s e d .
This rule emphasizes an attorney's public
duty as an officer of the court, as opposed to the
attorney's private duty to represent a client's
interest zealously. Clark v. Booth, 168 Utah
Adv. Rep. 7 (1991).
Reasonable inquiry.
Certification by an attorney "that to the best
of his knowledge, information, and belief
formed after a reasonable inquiry the complaint is well grounded in fact and is war-

— Q u e s t i o n of l a w .
Whether specific conduct amounts to a violation of this rule is a question of law. Taylor v
Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163 (Utah Ct. App.
1989); Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202 (Utah
Ct. App. 1991).
—Sanctions.
This rule gives trial courts great leeway to
tailor the sanction to fit the requirements of
the particular case. Taylor v. Estate of Taylor,
770 P.2d 163 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Imposition of $5,000 in attorney fees as a
sanction for violating this rule was not an
abuse of discretion, where the wrong document
was attached to the complaint, causing defendants to incur legal expense in researching the
validity of an irrelevant document and preparing a motion to dismiss based thereon. Taylor
v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989).
—Standard.
Sanctions were improper against an attorney, where opposing parties conceded that no

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
particular document was signed in violation of
the rule, but simply argued that even if the
attorney believed the case was well grounded
when he filed the complaint, he should have
known a a e r he met with counsel for defendants that the case could not go forward.
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Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202 (Utah Ct. App.
1991).
.
l
« « « ! » « W a k Q e ' v ^ a , r , S O n « 7f
™
™
^ a h Ct. App.1987); State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d
1201 (Utah Ct
A
PP 1 9 9 1 ) -

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
U t a h L a w R e v i e w . — Recent Developments
in Utah Law — Legislative Enactments — Attorney's Fees, 1989 Utah L. Rev. 342.
B r i g h a m Y o u n g L a w R e v i e w . — Curbing
Discovery Abuse in Civil Litigation: Enough Is
Enough, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev 579.
Curbing Discovery Abuse in Civil Litigation:
We're Not There Yet, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 597.
Note, Appellate Review of Rule 11 Issues —
De Novo or Abuse of Discretion? Thomas v.
Capital Security Services, Inc., 1989 B.Y.U. L.
Kev. oil.
i c o ^ n v l TT an , « e d e r o a m g L a W y e r E t h , C S '
1991 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 959
,
„.
ff.A
A
i
o j m J:
AA m . J u r . 2d. — 61A Am. Jur. 2d Pleading
KR Qio •„ QAQ
f>8 339 to 349.
C.J.S. - 71 C.J S. Pleading §§ 339 to 366.
A . L . R . - L i a b i l i t y of attorney, acting for client, for malicious prosecution, 46 A.L.R.4th
249
Inherent power of federal district court to
impose monetary sanctions on counsel in absence of contempt of court, 77 A.L.R. Fed. 789.
Comment Note — General principles regarding imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 95 A.L.R. Fed.
107.

Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to
signing and verification of pleadings, in actions for defamation, 95 A.L R Fed. 181.
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to
signing and verification of pleadings, in action
f o r w r o n g f u i discharge from employment, 96
h\,\x
\?Vi\ in.
i m p o s j l i o n 0 f sanctions under Rule 11. Fede r a ] R u | e g o f C i v i , P r o c e d u r e > pertaining to
signing and verification of pleadings, in actions for securities fraud, 97 A.L.R. Fed. 107.
.
.L.
..
,
„ . ..
,
Imposition
of sanctions under Rule 11, rFed• ,, ,
r> i n
J
* • •
»
eral Rules ofr Civil Procedure, pertaining to
.
,
t- Lc i JBl nin
^ «
and verification of pleadings, in ac«<»» f o r infliction of emotional distress, 98
A.L.R. Fed. 442.
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to
signing and verification of pleadings, in antitrust actions, 99 A.L.R. Fed. 573.
Procedural requirements for imposition of
sanctions under Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 100 A L.R. Fed. 556.
K e y N u m b e r s . — Pleading «= 287 to 304.

Rule 12. Defenses and objections.
(a) When presented. A defendant shall serve his answer within twenty
days after the service of the summons and complaint is complete unless otherwise expressly provided by statute or order of the court. A party served with a
pleading stating a cross-claim against him shall serve an answer thereto
within twenty days after the service upon him. The plaintiff shall serve his
reply to a counterclaim in the answer within twenty days after service of the
answer or, if a reply is ordered by the court, within twenty days after service
of the order, unless the order otherwise directs. The service of a motion under
this rule alters these periods of time as follows, unless a different time is fixed
by order of the court:
(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the
trial on the merits, the responsive pleading shall be served within ten
days after notice of the court's action;
(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the
responsive pleading shall be served within ten days after the service of
the more definite statement.
(b) H o w presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-patty claim,
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ROBERT J. DEBRY
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorney for Plaintiff
965 East 4800 South, Suite 2
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84117
Telephone: (801) 26 2-8915
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
GEORGE K. SCHONEY and
IRMA J. SCHONEY, for
themselves and all others
similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,

ORDER

vs
MEMORIAL ESTATES, INC. and,
MEMORIAL ESTATES CEMETERY
DEVELOPMENT CORP., corporation and JOHN DOES 1 through
1C, individuals,
Defendants

Civil No.

C 82-4983

Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification was heard by
the Court on December 14, 1982.
Robert J. DeBry.

Plaintiff was represented by

Defendant was represented by David Swope.

The Court has considered the nemoranda and the arguments of
counsel.
The Court now makes the following findings:
1.

Defendant has sold a total of 124 crypts at their
Mountain

View

Cemetery.

Defendant

has

sold

an

additional 388 crypts at their Redwood Road Cemetery.
The total of 512 satisfies the numerosity requirement
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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of Rule 23(a)(1) U.R.C.P.
divide

the

class

into

If it becomes necessary to
subclasses

under

Rule

23

(c) (4) (B) ; the Redwood Road subclass would independently

satisfy the numerosity

Mountain View subclass would

requirement and the
independently satisfy

the numerosity requirement.
All members of the class have executed identical
contract forms.

The standard form contract satisfies

the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2) U.R.C.P.
Some common issues are:

when is defendant required

to build the mausoleums?

Has defendant oversold the

existing

mausoleum

facilities?

Is

defendant

obligated to provide chapel space?
The Schoneys signed the same form contract which was
signed

by

other

class

members.

Therefore

the

Schoneys satisfy the typicality requirement of Rule
23(a) (3) U.R.C.P.
Defendants have stipulated that plaintiffs1 counsel
will fairly and adequately protect the interests of
the

class;

and

the

provision

of

Rule

23(a)(4)

U.R.C.P. is therefore satisfied.
Defendant must build a mausoleum for everyone—or no
mausoleum at all.
chapel

for

Moreover, defendant must build a

everyone—or

no

mausoleum

at

all.

Defendant cannot be ordered by one court to build a
chapel, only to have another court order them not to
build a chapel.

Therefore, this case satisfies Rule
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23(b)(1)(A) U.R.C.P. in that inconsistent adjudications with respect to individual members of the class
would

create

standards

of

a risk

of

conduct

for

establishing
the party

incompatible
opposing

the

class.
6.

This case also satisfies the requirements of Rule
23(b)(3) U.R.C.P. in that common questions predominate over individual questions.

Based on the foregoing findings it is hereby ordered that:
1*

This case is hereby certified to proceed as a class
action.

2.

The class members are all those persons who have
signed a standard form agreement for the purchase of
mausoleum space from defendant.

3.

It will not be necessary to create sub-classes at the
present time.

4.

The class will be certified under Rule 23(b) (1) (A) ,
U.C.R.P.

In order to give res judicata effect to

the entire class, the case will not be certified
under Rule 23(b)(3) U.R.C.P., Johnson v. Baton Rouge,
50 F.R.D. 295(1970).
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5.

Because the class is certified under Rule 23(b)(1)(A)
U.R.C.P., it will not be necessary to give notice.
Rule 23(c) (2) U.R.C.P.
BY THE COURT:

PHILIP FISCHLER
Approved as to form
DAVID SWOPE
, •' • •
ROBERT J. DEBRY

Approved as to form
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George

Schoney, et al - Appellant
VS
Memorial Estates - Respondent

»•i i~

'

\s* *
INDEX
District Court No. C82-49S3
Supreme Court No. 880317
Clerkfs Certificate
1
Complaint
2-11
Plaintiffs' Fir^t Set of Interrogatories
To Defendant Memorial Estates, Inc*
12-34
Summons
35-36, 37-38
Answer
39-44
Plaintiffs' Second Set of
Interrogatories
45-49
1
Answers To Plaintiffs First Set Of
Interrogatories To Defendant
Memorial Estates, Inc
50-108
Answers To Second Set of Plaintiffs?
Interrogatories
109-115
Request For Production of Documents
115A-117
Memorandum In Support of Motion For
Class Certification
118-124
Notice of Depositions
125-126
Motion To Amend
127
First Amended Complaint
128-135
Notice of Hearing
136-137
Response Of Defendants Memorial Estates,
Inc., And Memorial Estates Cemetery
Development Corp., To Plaintiff's
Request For Production of Documents
138—140
Defendants Memorandum In Opposition
To Plaintiffs Motion For Class
Certification
141-145
Affidavit of Kenith Hughes
146-147
Amended Notice of Hearing
148-149
Counter Affidavit of George Schoney
150-151
Notice of Hearing
152
Answer To First Amended Complaint
153-159
Minute Entry Dated Nov 5, 1982
160
Reply To Defendant's
Memorandum In
Opposition To Plaintiff's Motion
For Class Certification
161-165
Objection To Proposed Order
166-167
Defendant's Motion To Dismiss Count I
And Count IV Of Plaintiffs' First
Amended Complaint
168-169
Minute Entry Dated Nov 17, 1982
170
Order
171-172
Affidavit of Kenith Hughes
173-176
Renewed Notice of Hearing
177
Memorian Estates, Inc.'s
Supplemental Memorandum Of Points
And Authorities In Opposition
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Memories Estates - Respondent
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District Court No, C82-4983
Supreme Court No. 880317
Minute Entry Dated Dec 14, 1982
Minute Entry Dated Jan 18, 1983
Correspondence
Objections To Proposed Order On
Class Certification
Minute Entry Dated Feb 1, 1983
Second Request For Production of
Documents
Order
Amended Notice of-Depositions
Ruling On Objections
Defendant's First Request For Admissions
To Plaintiff
Request For Production of Documents
Defendants First Set of Interrogatories
To Plaintiffs
Second Amended Notice of Depositions
.-.Third Request For Production of Documents
Notice of Depositions
Defendant's Second Requests For Admissions
Notice of Taking Deposition
Answers To Defendant's First Set Of
Interrogatories
Answers To Defendant's Request For
Admissions
Response To Defendants1
Request For Production of Documents
Motion For An Order That Rule 23(c)
Shall Apply To The DDnstruction Of
Any Future Mausoleums And To The Rehabilitation of The Chapel
Notice of Hearing
Certification of Readiness For Trial
Minute Entry Dated May 10, 1983
Renewal Notice of Hearing On Moyion For
An Order That Rule 23(c) Shall Apply
To The Construction Of Any Future
Mausoleums And To The Rehabilitation
Of The Chapel
Notice of Hearing
Objection To Plaintiffs' Certification For
Readiness For Trial
Minute Entry Dated May 24, 1983
Renewal Notice of Hearing On Motion For An
Order That Rule 23 (c) Shall Apply To
The Construction Of Any Future Mausoleums And To The Rehabilitation Of
The Chapel

185
186
187-190
191-195
196
197-201
202-204
205-206
207-208
209-211
212-213
214-222
223-224
225-228
229-230
231-233
234-235
236-250
251-256
257-259

260-261
262
263
264

265-266
267r-268
269-270
271

272-273
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District Court No. C82-4983
Supreme Court No- 880317
Notice of Hearing
"Motion To Amend
Motion To Enlarge Class
Memorandum In Support of Motion To
Enlarge Class
Second Amended Complaint
Notice of Hearing
Minute Entry Dated Jun 17, 1983
Motion That Notice Be Given To Class
Members Prior To Any Construction
For New Mausoleum Space Or Rehabilitation Of The Chapel
Answer To Second Amended Complaint
Order
Interrogatories
Defendant Memorial Estates In. Second
Request For Admission To The Plaintiffs
Minute Entry Dated Aug 1, 1983
Order
Objection To Order
Motion F O E Relief From Order
Answers To Defendants1 Second'Request
For Admissions
Answers To Defendantsf Second Set Of
Interrogatories
Motion To Amend Order
Subpoena Duces Tecum
Affidavit
Notice of Hearing
Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial
Summary Judgment
Memorandum In Support of Plaintiffs1
Motion For Partial Summary
Judgment
Minute Entry Dated Spe 2, 1983
Notice of Hearing
Certification of Readiness For Trial
Notice of Continuance
Notice of Hearing
Defendant Memorial Estates, Inc.Ts
Memorandum In Opposition To
Plaintiff's Motion For Partial
Summary Judgment
Affidavit of Delmar Holt, Jr.
Affidavit Of Kenith Hughes
Minute Entry Dated Oct 7, 1983
Notice

274-275
276-277
278-279
280-291
292-308
309
310

311-312
313-325
326-328
328A-332
333-335
336
337-339
340-345
346-351
352-355
356-364
365-366
367-367A
368-369
370-371
372-374

375-386
387
388-389
390
391-392
393-394

395-404
405-406
407-409
410
411
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District Court No, C82w4983
Supreme Court No. 880317
Minute Entry Dated Nov 29, 1983
Notice of Deposition
Affidavit
Motion For> Attorneys1 Fees
Notice of Hearing
Motion To Publish Depositions
Minute Entry Dated Feb 7, 1984
Renewed Motion For Partial Summary
Judgment And Motion For Partial
Summary Judgment As To Mountain
View Sub-Class
Memorandum In Support of Plaintiff's
Motion For Partial Summary Judgment
As To Mtn. View Sub-Class
Notice of Hearing
Notice of Hearing
Renewed Notice of Hearing On Motion
To Enlarge Class
0*-der To Show Cause
Notice of Hearing On Motion For Summary
Judgment Or Partial Summary Judgment
Defendant Memorial Estates, Inc's
Memorandum In Support of Summary
Judgment Or Partial Summary Judgment
Defendantfs Motion To Decertify Or Reduce
The£lass Action Or In The Alternative
Defendant's Opposition To Plaintiffs'
Motion To Enlarge The Class
Defendant Memorial Estate Inc's Motion
For Summary Judgment Or In The Altera
native For Partial Summary Judgment
Motion For Order Requiring Defendants
To Show Cause Why Memorial Estates
Should Not Be Held In Contempt Of
Court For Vilating A Court Order
Memorandum In Support of Plaintiff's Motion
For Order Requiring Defendants To Show
Cause
Notice of Hearing Regarding The* Class
Decertification
Defendant's Reply To Plaintiffs1 Order
To Show Cause

412
413-416
417-419
420-425
426-427
428-429
430

431T433

434-460
461-462
463-464
465-466
467-469
470-471

472-486

487-493

494^495

496

497r-503
504-505
506-
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District Court No. C82-4983
Supreme Court No. 880317
Affidavit of Robert B. Hansen
Stipulation And Order
Order
Notice of Hearing
Minute Entry DatedApr 6, 1984
Motion For New Appointment Of Trial Judge
Plaintiffs' Response To Defendants1
Motion For Attorney's Fees
Plaintiffs' Memorandum In Opposition
To Defendants1 Motion To Decertify
Plaintiffs1 Response To Defendants'
Motion For Summary Judgment
Notice of Hearing
Notice of Hearing
Notice of Hearing
Minute Entry Dated Feb 15, 1985
Scheduling Order
Amended Notice of Hearing
Affidavit of Kenith Hughes
Minute Entry Dated Feb 22, 1985
Motion To Amend
Notice of Hearing
Plaintiffs1 Fourth Amended Complaint
Objection To Supplemental Memoranda
Dated February 24, 1985 and
February 26, 1985
Minute Entry Dated Mar 1, 1986
Order
Reply To Objection To Supplemental
Memorandum
Defendant Memorial Estates1 Memorandum
In Response To Plaintiffs' Memorandums
Correspondence
Plaintiffs' Rebuttal Re: Defendants'
Motion To Decertify Thee Class
Notice of Hearing
Affidavit of Robert J Debry
Plaintiffs' Motion To Vacate Bench Ruling
Denying Plaintiffs' Motion To
Amend And Renewed Motion To Amend
Defendants' Objection To Plaintiffs'
Rebuttal Re: Defendants' Motion To
Decertify The Class
Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion For
Partial Summary Judgment

510-514
515-516
517-518
519-520
521
522-524
525-527
528-552
553-571
572-573
574-575
576-577
578
579
580-581
582-584
585
586-587
588-589
590-610

611-612
613
614-615
616-619
620-625
626-627
628-631
632-633
634-636

637-638

639-640
641-642
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District Court No. C82-4983
Supreme Court No. 880317
Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion
To Amend
643-644
Defendant Memorial Estates, Inc.'s
Memorandum In Opposition To
Plaintiffs' Motion To File Their
Fourth Amended Complaint
645-647
Plaintiffs1 Fourth Amended Complaint
648-664
Notice of Hearing
665-676
Plaintiffs1 Reply To Defendant Memorial
Estates Inc's Memorandum In
Opposition To Plaintiffs1 Motion
To File Their Fourth Amended Complaint
677-680
Minute Entry Dated May 10, 1985
681
Notice of Hearing
682-683
Motion To Settle Orders
684-685
Amended Notice of Hearing
686-687
Amended Notice of Hearing
688-689
Order Granting Motion To Amend
690-692
Order Denying Defendant's Motion For
Summary Judgment Or Partial
Summary Judgment
693-694
Order
695-697
Order Denying Motion To Amend
698-699
Order Denying Defendants1 Motion For
Summary Judgment Or Partial Summary
Judgment
700-701
Order
702-703
Order Decertifying The Class
704-705
Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion To
Enlarge The Class
706-707
Minute Entry Dated Jul 12, 1985
708
Correspondence
709
Renewed Motion For Entry Of Findings
of Fact On TheDecertification Order
710-712
Notice of Hearing
713-714
Order Denying Motion To Amend
715^717
Objection To The Form Of Defendant's
Proposed Findings
718-991
Affidavit of Paul Moore
992-994
Defendant's Motion To Strike The
Affidavit of Paul Moore
995-997
Petition For Writ of Mandamus
998
Memorandum In Support of Petition For
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MINUTE ENTRY DATED MAY 1, 1991
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MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO APPOINT
CLASS REPRESENTATIVE BY INTERVENTION
OF ABSENT CLASS MEMBERS, OR IN THE
ALTERNATIVE, TO ALLOW PLAINTIFF ERMA
SCHONEY TO CONTINUE TO REPRESENT THE
INTERESTS OF THE CLASS
MOTION TO APPOINT CLASS REPRESENTATIVE BY
INTERVENTION OF ABSENT CLASS MEMBERS
OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TO ALLOW
PLAINTIFF ERMA SCHONEY TO CONTINUE TO
REPRESENT THE INTERESTS OF THE CLASS
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
TO APPOINT CLASS REPRESENTATIVE, AND
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SANTIONS COUNSEL
REPLY MEMORANDUM
NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION

l^i'^ofi
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ROBERT J. DE3RY - AO04 9
ROBERT J. DE3RY ft ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants
4001 South 700 East, Suite*500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 262-8915
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
GEORGE K. SCHONEY and
ERMA J. SCHONEY, et al. ,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,
vs.

)
)
)

PETITION FOR WRIT OF
MANDAMUS TO THE UTAH
COURT OF APPEALS

i

Case No.

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS,
Defendants/Respondents.

]

Plaintiffs-Appellants (hereinafter Schoneys) petition
this Court

for a Writ of Mandamus compelling the Court of

Appeals to receive the Brief of Appellant dated February 21,
1989.

This petition is supported by the memorandum of points

and authorities filed herewith.
INTERESTED PARTIES
The
Memorial

interested

Estates, Inc.

parties

to this

(Defendant-appellee

petition

include:

below);

the Utah

Court of Appeals; and petitioners (plaintiffs-appellants).
ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Whether the Court of Aooeals has Dower to refuse

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

to extend time for filing a brief without considering the "good
cause" for the delay.
2.

Whether the Court of Appeals should be required

to honor its own order (or letter) which granted a continuance
for filing a Brief,
RELIEF SOUGHT
1.

A writ directing the Court of Appeals to receive

petitioner's appeal brief dated February 24, 1989.
REASONS FOR EXTRAORDINARY WRIT
The facts necessary to consider the issues presented
by this petition are set forth in the supporting memorandum
filed separately.

The reasons why no other relief is adequate,

and the orders necessary to consider the petition, are also set
forth in the supporting memorandum and appendix.
DATED this

day of / c<C— "Tfkfl^

1989.

ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant

Bv:
ROBERT~3. DESRY
ts=>t
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS TO
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS, postage prepaid, this
of

^ ^ f f l ; l ^ ^ C / / t e > - L 9 8 9 to the following:

TTT

Arthur H. Nielsen
Joseph L. Henriod
David Swope
NIELSEN & SENIOR
P.O. Box 11808
36 South State St.
Salt Lake City, Utah

84111

Clerk
Court of Appeals
230 Sourh 500 East, #400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

schonev.001
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BEFORE THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
GEORGE K. SCHONEY and ERMA
J. SCHANEY, et. al. ,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
Case No. 890213

vs.
MEMORIAL ESTATES, INC.,
et. al.,
Defendants and Appellees

ORAL ARGUMENTS
FROM ELECTRONICS TAPES

TAKEN

DATE:

AT:

Supreme Court, 332 State Capitol, salt LaKe city,
Utah

December 4, 1989

REPORTED BY:

Beverly Lowe.

CSR

From the Reporting Offices of:

Capitol Reporters
9837
File No.

P. O. Box 1477, Salt Uke City, Utah 84110
(801) 3 6 3 - 7 9 3 9
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DISCOVERT ZX-

APPEARANCES

EDWARD WELLS
DeBry & Associates
4252 South 700 East
Murray, Utah 84107

STEVEN HENRIOD
HENRIOD & HENRIOD
60 East South Temple #700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

JUDGE GORDON R. HALL
322 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

JUDGE MICHAEL D. ZIMMERMAN
322 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

JUDGE CHRISTINE M. DURHAM
322 State Capitol-Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
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1

Monday, December

2

4, 1989, 9:00

LAW AND

3

Appellant's Motion

a.m.

(tape)

MOTION

to Recall

Jurisdiction

4
5
6

THE COURT: Moving
versus Memorial

7

to Number

MR. W E L L S : I'm

Edward W e l l s , appearing

on

Your Honor, basically

the

behalf

of the S c h o n e y s .

9

relief

we're seeking here

is to have this

10

bring

11

the court of appeals back

12

the provisions

13

court

14

case back on jurisdictional

the matter which has been forwarded

over

Under

7822 subparagraph

17

over

18

think

the court order and can bring

jurisdiction

is

21

I

that this --

THE COURT: What
appeals

judgment

of the court of

involved?

MR. W E L L S : W e l l , Justice Zimmerman

22

what has happened

23

judgment.

over

--

is n o t , in effect, a formal

THE COURT: W e l l ,
jurisdiction

the

under

the judgments of the court of a p p e a l s .

19

to

matters.

3 ( a ) , this court has

it's important

to

that rule, this

It's our p o s i t i o n , Your H o n o r , that

16

25

court

to this court pursuant

of Rule 4AF.

can review

15

24

Schoney

Estates.

8

20

3,

then how can we have

it?
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1

(Oral

2

MR. WELLS: Well, it has

3

THE COURT: Because you

5

some

6

no

things

final

failed

on appeal and waive

judgment

7
has

9

and

been

ruled

later

them,

but

court, which

11

23 of the dismissal

12

That

it affects

you've waived

14

failed

to be filed,

16

appeal.

17

the whole

they entered

it?

the issue was not

to allow
raised

the brief

on the

it in your

statement?
MR. WELLS: It was raised

in the

20

THE COURT: You can argue

it at

22

Rule

an order

19

argument

of the

class under

THE COURT: Did you raise
docketing

brief,

is a judgment

MR. WELLS: By refusing

15

to

the court

of class.

THE COURT: Have
saying

there's

entered.

that, we

therefore waived.

10

21

of a

to breach

MR. WELLS: Back to the question,

8

18

the effect

judgment.

4

13

Argument)

presumably,

can't

docket.
oral

you?

MR. WELLS: Well, there's a question of

23 J whether

or not

that

is sufficient.

24

us that

through what we perceive

25

mistake

in the clerk's office,

It appears

to

to be a procedural

they

have
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1
2
3

(Oral Argument)
misconstrued what occurred.
What happened is that there was a

4

breakdown on the computer at the office, which

5

coincided, unfortunately, with the death of

6

Mr. DeBry's father.

7

Mr. DeBry on a case, went to the court of appeals

8

in an effort to comply with the deadline and said,

9

"We need an additional extension because basically

The attorney was helping

10

the brief is locked in the computer and we can't

11

get it out.

12

in fact working on the brief, we will file this

13

preliminary draft,11 which was done.

14

Now, to show good faith, that we are

Then a letter was received back from the

15

clerk's office saying that they had until the 24th

16

of February to file the brief.

17

fact filed ahead of that with the motion to allow

18

an oversized brief to be filed.

19

repaired, and we got the brief back.

20

The brief was in

Computer was then

THE COURT: And the motion was denied,

21

since presumably it was filed -- should have been

22

filed earlier before you finished your brief, but

23

that seems to be kind of local practice, to hope

24

that we'll give you forgiveness and not

25

permission.
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1

(Oral Argument)

2

MR. WELLS: Well, that's true.

I think

3

where the error occurred is that instead of

4

allowing us to file a brief that was logged into

5

the computer —

6

us to use as our brief the first draft that had

7

been prepared long before that.

8

lost in the computer, they required

Now, I can understand that, saying that

9

you've got to file what was there on the day that

10

you asked for the extension, but to prejudice the

11

class by saying that because it was lost in the

12

computer, and that as a good faith effort to show

13

that you were moving forward in filing a previous

14

addition that didn't have all the issues in it,

15

you're now locked into those issues --

16
17

THE COURT: They haven't said that.
say that .

18
19

You

MR. WELLS: The effect of what they have
done says that.

20

THE COURT: You still have oral argument.

21

You had a docketing statement, so you can still

22

argue it,

23

sort of in coed down there.

24
25

which means that everything is presently

We don't know what's going to happen.
Aren't you just up here doing the same thing you
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(Oral
2 | tried

Argument)

to do about a month ago when you filed a

3 I Mandamus petition against
4

MR. W E L L S : W e l l , what we're

5

now

6

it to proceed

7

should have proceeded

is to get

8
9

the court of

this court

to take

expeditiously

appeals?

trying

to do

it back and

allow

and on the basis it

in the first place.

That's basically what we're asking, is
that

this —

it would be somewhat nebulous

10

the court of appeals

11

and

12

an appellate

in effect

13

to review

its own

to allow

judgment,

sit in review of its own judgment
court reviewing

What we're asking

itself.

this court

position as the appellate

15

a p p e a l s , is to take a look at what's happened

16

this case

18

be

19

over the court of
in

—
THE COURT: What

would

court

to do in your

14

17

as

is the judgment

that

they

reviewing?
MR. W E L L S : You would be reviewing
to allow

20

refusal

of the court

21

filed.

We can understand

22

overlength

23

have no problem with that.

24

do that they are, under

fairness and due

25

c o n s i d e r a t i o n , required

to give us at least a day

brief, that's

that

the brief

the

to be

if they deny

an

in their discretion.
But we think once
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We
they

process

8

(Oral
or two to edit

Argument)

it down to the page

THE COURT: Why?
you want

requirement.

The rules provide that if

to file an overlength b r i e f , you can get

permission

in advance.

If you ask

for it the day

you file the brief, you take the risk it will be
thrown out.
Local practioners
that

they'll

seem

to have the notion

come up here and people will

accept

any old thing you can crank o u t , no matter how many
p a g e s , but the rules are very

explicit.

If you want an overlength

brief, you can

ask for permission before you write
waiting

and not editing

it, instead of

it and hoping

that

they'll

just take whatever you get done with.
It seems

to me there isn't anything

except a refusal of them

here

to grant you permission

file an overlength brief, which you want

to

to

appeal.
MR. W E L L S : W e l l , but what
point was they then said,
deny

that

"Not only are we going

that to you, but we won't

file the actual brief

they did at

that was

even allow you to
in the computer

the date that it should have been
THE COURT: The rules

on

filed."

require you to
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file

to

1

(Oral Argument)

2

something physical, not whatever you happen to have

3

in your head, on your computer, in the car, or in

4

the mai1.

5

MR. WELLS: Well, unfortunately, Your

6

Honor, we live in a technical age.

Sometimes

7

something gets into a computer and it's physically

8

impossible to get it out at a certain time.

9

that, because of a computer breakdown, a whole

To say

10

class of defendants are now wiped out of this case,

11

I think denies due process.

12

THE COURT: It's not because of a computer

13

breakdown.

14

brief two weeks late.

15

It's because you filed an overlength

MR. WELLS: That wasn't the original

16

problem, Your Honor.

17

on the day that they filed this preliminary draft,

18

the computer was broken.

19

current addition on that.

20

good faith, they filed something.

21

The original problem was that

They could not get the
So, in an effort to show

Now, to say that because of the computer

22

breakdown, we can't get it out of the court of

23

appeals, this class of defendants is just wiped out

24

of the lawsuit, I think is a basic denial of due

25

process
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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10
1

(Oral Argument)

2

THE COURT: No, they're only saying because

3

you filed an overlength brief which they chose not

4

to accept, that you may have prejudiced your class

5

-- your clients.

6

That's true.

MR. WELLS: That's true, but then to go

7

back and say you can't file -- they ordered us to

8

go back and file what we had on our tape.

9

locked into the computer.

10

That was

What had been delivered

was the preliminary draft.

11

To say that you have to live with the

12

preliminary draft, you can't even bring in what you

13

have on that date because it was in the computer

14

and we couldn't get it out; that's where I think

15

the problem was.

16

It isn't the exercise of the discretion

17

denying the right to file an oversized brief.

18

saying that you can't pull it out of the computer

19

and file what you had on that date.

20

file the preliminary draft, which was only given as

21

an effort to show that we were, in fact, working on

22

a brief at that point.

23

It's

You've got to

And as you say, the court can't enter

24

their lodging policy, lodge something that doesn't

25

exist.

But what we're saying is, that due to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(Oral
consideration
due process

Argument)

of the computer

should

breakdown,

allow us tc at least

we had on that date and

file

that b a s
take what

it.

THE COURT: How long was

it, do you

know?

MR. W E L L S : I do not know, 'four Honor,
THE COURT: Since

it was

it d i d n ? t have p a g e s .

presumably

MR. WELLS: Well,
Your Honor.
allowed
at

in the computer ..

I?m

What

to pull

least have

look back and

I don't know

saying

it cut and

is that

they

take it over
have

the opportuni ty

should

there, an

the c o u r '

then decide.

THE COURT: Mr. W e i l s , about
for this court

to recall

mentioned

4AF, I believe.

Rule

that ei the

the

jurisdiction,

authorit

you

MR, WELLS: Yes.
THE COURT: Dees
for that

that specifically

procedure?
MR. W E L L S : That provides

that's

provid

the provision

that says

that

the --

the only basis

w h i c h this court

can review a decision

(inaudible)

is on jurisdictional

over

we're saying
that and basically

is, we want

say,

"Ail

on

to

grounds.

you to

right, we as
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review
an

(Oral
appelate

court will

Argument)

look at what's happened

because we are the only court

that

can do

be, I think, violating

a court

can't

review

its own

THE COURT: Well,
jurisdictional

problem,

!

.^ •»- a

aparo;
would

there,

* '^ 3 *•

the statute

that say-

order.

this really

isn't a

is it?

MR. WELLS: Pardon

me?

THE COURT: Th:. s rea-iiy is not a
jurisdictional

problem.

MR. W E L L S : Well,
the

sense

review

—

that

this

court

the jurisdictional

judgments

of appeals

is applying

that

look at that and

their

power

i o n a .1 m

the

power

to review

review

to

the

internal

if the court
rules

constitutional

rights

to

to take a

Henricd?
Stephen Henriod

the Respondent, Memorial

has anticipated

in such

them.

MR. HENRIOD: I'm

the q u e s t i o n s .

that

this court has a right

THE COURT: Mr,

court

has

be our position

as to deny basic

litigants,

represent

jurisd.

of the court of a p p e a l s .
It would

a manner

it's

and I

Estates,

The

my a r g u m e n t , as indicated

It's the position

of

the
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by

13
(Oral Argument ;
respondents

that

this

is not a

jurisdictional

matter, but rather a procedural
of ioneals
briefing

properly

^.he rules

the

court

regarding

schedule.
We f d also

that

enforced

one, that

the timing

like to point

on this whole

out

thing

to the
is

court

somewhat

suspect.
The class

issue which

the plaintiff

to make a lot out of was dismissed
between

four and

days

in which

this brief

filed, between

could

It was over

and

should
amd

the substitute

the court was

filed

brief

pursuant
The

language

in the pleading,

that

included

to file a substitute brief
corrections

shows

and move

there's no explanation

very
they

computer.
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wanted
the

in the

in the

brief

was

to the

on with

that are allowed

that a longer and a more detailed
the

been

for

that

lodging policy.

policy

have

SO

the ex

then the two motions

court of a p p e a l f s

technical

court

time.

Clearly
filed with

1333.

the 30 day extention

parte extention and
additional

of

by a lower

The a p p e1a t e ! s

five years ago.

brief was due in December

wants

motion

existed

in

u^en t

c cine 2 5 t ^ 1 •'

;e

o . J u r, i :

. - :

( i r*3ud i b 1 8 '

tortur.3'

wa s

issues
Mr

: =>

c*.

the pleadings

and will

appeals where
appelated
these

refer

G

.n

ca^p

be

£3. t ^ ^"** ' s a e a t n
3 e 3 rrr

M ^

that

the

sense

o

this is a procedura1

it back

to

the court of

these very arguments

reply

to

in at least o v e : a year.

We will submit
matter

J63 rv ' s

us

,:: d

t v , :

signing

s e e in t o

to t h e m, and

appear

that

and

they can

exhaus

petitions.
ir . Wells?
your r.or.or*

A:-^:

note

that

in response

to Justice

question about whether or not
1 O

1 O

final

judgment

court

is correct

and

in that

if the court dees,

perhaps
20

has

if that does not

in fact, allow

the very problem

involved

will

then

disappear,

that

that

is going
issue

If they do that, then I
that

the court, of the due process
class

the

happen,

those,

that counsel

the court of appeals

in fact been waived.

believe

is, in effect, a

a c l a s s , I believe

the due process questions

to

^;

Zimmerman's

this

3 u t I have a concern
to argue

o ?

and affecting

j. would

then raise

Z have suggested
considerations
their head-.
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to

to
the

( Oral
Perhaps
that

because

I've

that

the on1y

court was generally
raised

issues with which

familiar

in argument

the class

issues

orocess

on the class.

precluded

in brief.

the concern a r i s e s , is that
impact

l!?^

those

from

That's

where

this could have an

Perhaps

this would

be a due

COURT: Thank y o u , g e n 11 e m e n .

take the matter under

advisemen

(Concluded)
16

13

20

o i

9

the

are

consicerat.ion

court will

that,

in briefs.

We've been basically

10

experienced

to a court of appeals., it's been my

experience

raising

Z do hav •

this is free choice, but

consideration

where going

Argument}

K
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1|

March

2|

12, 1990 Oral

(Electronically

3

recorded)

P R O C E E D I N G S

4

THE COURT: Please

5

MR. DeBRY:

6

Argument

DeBry

representing

7

proceed.

If it please
the

the Court,

appelant.

In this case during
of 1989, about

the final briefing

8

February

9

brief was due my father passed

two weeks before

10

that

11

office and out of action.

away.

I was with family m a t t e r s , away

12

We'd already

received

13

continuences, modest

14

illness and vacation s c h e d u l e s .

15

in the

16

briefing

17

trying

the

from

in

final

Because

a couple

continuences

family we were

Robert

of

the

of

because of
So, with a death

to meet

the

final

schedule.
On the due date of the brief, with a lot

18

of scurrying

19

that

20

down.

21

Court

22

and had been circulated

23

the computer

24

with a motion

25

brief

at

around, we were

the last minute

ready

the word

Because of that quandary,
a preliminary

draft

brief

around

to file,

processor

after we got

to

had been

the office

broke down, and we filed
for permission

broke

we brought
that

except

that

this
done

before
brief

to file a substitute

the word processor
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repaired.

1

Our motion specifically

2

of the brief

is not

the current

3

draft

4

in the word processor

we left with the Court

5

the draft

one -- that

is the

-- the current

one is

memory.

Later on there was some motions, and

6

Bench ruled

7

brief

8

memory

9

brief .

that we were not permitted

which was finished,

albeit

and we were stuck with

10

Now,

I'm not

trying

earlier

rulings, but

12

hearing

panel

13

merits, a word of explanation

14

the brief you have in front

15

sketchy;

16

draft

and you have

the fact

in the

to hear

of you

Although we don't wish
earlier

19

be available

20

some problems

21

assistance

22

sketchy

brief.

We'd

23

a supplemental

brief

24

any

those

this on the

is in order as to why

it was a partial

18

30-page

this is the

is rather
preliminary

brief, and by its very appearance

17

is sketchy.

to reargue

the

ruling by Judge Bench, we certainly

would

if the Court has some questions
or if you require

on any issue

the

computer

the original

I think since

Judge

to file

to reargue

11

25

stated

some

that's not

certainly

additional

clear

from

be available

if the Court

or

requests

our

to file
that

on

issues .
THE COURT: The problem

with
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that was

that

II

you

asked

2

misunderstanding

31

filing

4I

to file an overlength

5

correct?

6

didn't

7

under Judge Bench's

1

an extension

-- there

-- you asked

for an extension

the brief, but you didn't

So, you did get

10

computers,

we don't

12

know,

the

13

funeral.

14

didn't

15

we couldn't

16

until we got

17|

it out, but

it's

but

you
brief

ruling.
that's

true, your

is, as I understand

know how many pages

last minute.

We're cramming

all

-- you

There's been a
in the computer.

know how many pages were

the computer
it was a

20

your motion asking

2 11

brief?

fixed and

so

brief

it could

spit

misunderstanding.

THE COURT: Am
that a copy

We

in the computer,

really ask for the overlength

191

I understanding

correctly

of the 79-page brief was appended
leave

22

MR. DeBRY: No.

2 31

THE COURT: So,

25

on

there certainly was a misunderstanding.

11

24

a

permission

to file the overlength

Of course, our problem

18

ask for

the extension,

MR. DeBRY: I think
Honor, and

was

brief, as I recall; is that

get permission

8I

9

for

to file an

to

overlength

that's nowhere

in our

record?
MR. DeBRY: I don't

think

it's even here
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in

6

the courthouse.

I think

that was returned.

we filed

for permission -- we filed

brief

—

made a motion to file a supplemental

after

the computer was
What was with

which was according
old.

the

When

preliminary
brief

fixed.
that was a 30-page brief,

to my recollection about a week

It was a preliminary

draft.

The

79-page

brief was in the computer.
Turning

to the m e r i t s , I would

s u g g e s t , this is a summary

judgment motion

by Judge Moffat below; a reasonably
I don't

like to

think any individual

handled

complex case.

issue is

terribly

d i f f i c u l t , but I think there are a lot of issues.
Reasonably
case.

class action and a reasonably

About

five or seven years old, as I recall,

when Judge Moffat heard
I suggest
this.

this.

the heart

of our argument

What colors everything

ruling,

is that he didn't
When

argument

in Judge

read

the

the parties appeared

-- had the transcript

-- Judge Moffat basically s a y s ,
quote,

complex

"I haven't had a chance

is

Moffat's

record.
for oral

of the oral
"Good

argument

morning,"

to look at the

file."
So, we have a judge who is ruling on a
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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1

fairly

complex summary

2

contested

3

haven't

5

motion with many

fact issues, and what he says is, "I

read

4

judgment

the file."

THE COURT: Did he rule from
that

hearing?

6

MR. DeBRY: Yeah, he ruled

7

What he had
in his hand

in his hand

8

he had

9

recall a transcript, opposing

10

the bench at

that he could

copy of the fifth amended

11

Now, what

13

the hearing we have defense

14

making proffers of proof, s a y i n g ,

15

version

16

have

17

proffers and saying,

18

version of

the facts."

19

making

independent

20

affidavits

21

from

any

thing

look at is, as I

is -- if I can

characterize

the plaintiff's

-- the only

counsel handed him a

12

of the facts."

the bench.

complaint.

follows

the hearing

from

-- about

Then

counsel

the first half of

counsel

"Judge

sort of

making

this is my

the judge

inquiry

or any documents

this is my

the second half we

"Judge, w e l l ,
Then

basically

without

or looking

at

or d e p o s i t i o n s , rules

the bench.

22

THE COURT: Let me just ask a question,

23

Mr. DeBry.

24

reading

25

dismissed

Maybe

I misunderstood,

the briefs indicate
the complaint

that

but my notes on

the

as a sanction
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judge
for

failure

8

1

to respond

to discovery.

Is that

incorrect?

2

MR. DeBRY: That was one

3

THE COURT: Now, he wouldn't

4

at anything

5

to discovery

6

he?

7

except

ground.

the timeliness

in order

need to look

of your

to rule on that

MR. DeBRY: I think

response

issue, would

that's partially

right.

8

I think there are three or four issues that were

9

legal

issues on which he could

10

oral argument.

11

you have

12

that.

13

That's one of them.

to look at something.

THE COURT: W e l l , and

14

is clear, that he premised

15

grounds.

16

be entered

17

discovery

18

for alleged

Secondly

20

stick on appeal —

21

will be granted

24
25

think

the judgment

on

itself

it on the two distinct

failure

judgment

will

to comply with

the

schedule.

had

23

But I do

Let me comment

First of all, the default

19

22

rule based on an

—

and assuming

it in the back of his mind

that he probably

that

that

wouldn't

secondly, a l s o , summary

judgment

on the m e r i t s .

So, I think he expressly

articulated

on

both of those grounds.
MR. DeBRY: That's right.
the other way around.

I think it was

I think he said

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

summary

1

judgment

2

that

3

ruling

on the merits, and by the way,

doesn't

stick as a discovery

on the discovery

4

Now,
think sort

6

law, but

7

some discretion.

8

that

9

rule as a matter

Judge Dillon's

the judge at

10

but as a matter

11

into whether

12

circumstances

that point

Our reading
sanction,

has to

of all

of law and dismiss

the cases

the

of why

14

viewpoint

is, and we told him at

15

basically

cumulative.

16

The case was

17

had

and

-- our

the brief

five or six years old anyway.

-- was
before.
They

of the parties.

Our representation

at

the hearing was

19

although

the mailing

certificate was accurate,

20

appeared

-- at

from our

21

(inaudible) and

22

judge didn't

23

even read

24

The answers were

25

look at the answers.

least
found

even

the

late.

It had all been done

taken depositions

can

inquire

is prejudiced,

the discovery was

is

complaint,

of discretion he should

or not anyone

of

exercise

yes, the judge

In this case the discovery

18

question, I

of he can rule on that as a matter

as a discovery

13

sanction -- a

sanction.

to answer

5

in case

the questions.

the discovery;
It wasn't

So, he couldn't
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He

the

didn't

handed

that morning.

it

-- we'd

it in the office, and

look at

filed

records

that

to him.

didn't

inquire

into

10

1

whether anyone was prejudiced, nor could he

2

inquire -- or balance

3

his

the circumstances

to apply

discretion.

4

What he said at the end of the hearing

5

was -- and his words were -- there's a Gardner

6

case, Gardner versus Parkwest V i l l a g e .

7

citation

8

said at the end of the hearing w a s , "The

9

case," q u o t e , "requires d i s m i s s a l , " end quote.

10

The

is in the briefing, but what the

judge
Gardner

Now, I would suggest

that

of law.

case, as well as all

The Gardner

that is error as

11

a matter

12

of the other

13

the judge has discretion and he may exercise

14

discretion.

15

option

cases on discovery

sanctions say

that
that

He has a range of o p t i o n s , and one

is to dismiss.

16

When he says the Gardner

17

d i s m i s s a l , I think he's saying

18

exercising

19

to look at .

20

case

requires

that he's not

his discretion, nor did he have

THE COURT: Typically,

21

when a case

22

that's

is dismissed

anything

locally at least,

as discovery

sanction,

the second of a two-step p r o c e s s .

23

First a party

24

date certain or appear

25

certain.

is ordered

to answer by a

for a deposition at a date

Only upon that

failure

is the
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ultimate

11
sanction

issued.

21
3

Do I understand
step was omitted

4
5

in this

first

step.

that

that

There had never been a

There had never

been a motion to --

THE COURT: There was a discovery

7

date, but

8

or your

there was no order directed

client

9

cut-off

against

you

—

MR. DeBRY: That's

10

first

case?

MR. DeBRY: Y e s .

6

11

correctly

right.

THE COURT: -- to answer

by a certain

date?

12

MR. DeBRY: That's

right.

13

THE COURT: Let me

just, before you get

14

into

the m e r i t s , ask another kind

15

question

that

16

briefs.

That was

17

depositions

18

they were material

issues of

19

summary

Is it true

20

depositions

21

level, and

22

at

the

I was concerned

judgment.

were never

filed

therefore were not

24

well.

25

went

preliminary
in reading

the

to a number of

of facts as to why
fact
that

that

precluded

these

at the district
before

Judge

court

Moffat

hearing?
MR. DeBRY: W e l l , I f m

23

about

that you cite

in your statement

of

Let me represent
to the Court

troubled

to the Court

-- back

by that as

that when we

to the clerk of the
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12
1

Court, my understanding

2

those had, in fact, been filed and been lost by the

3

clerk of the Court.

Our motion was to file a

4

motion

the record

5

depositions

6

the

to supplement

is those --

that several

to get all

in the record and be clear

those

they're

in

record.

7

Then when I started

8

thought, wait a minute.

9

the facts section and quoted

thinking about

It's true we had
from

it, I

written

those briefs, but

10

what should

11

reason we didn't do that is I suggest

12

court should be looking at what Judge Moffat had

13

his hand.

14

his hand was the fifth amended

15

didn't

16

depositions

the appelate court be looking at?

The only thing

The

appelate
in

that Judge Moffat had
complaint.

look at the record, I don't

think

in

Since he
those

mattered.

17

THE COURT: We could agree on that.

18

MR. DeBRY: Now, to respond

to Judge

19

B i l l i n g s ' further point, there were a couple of

20

other

21

for which

22

can just

23

reasonably well covered

24

happy

25

of

issues that I think were purely
the Judge could rule

from

tick those off, because

legal

issues

the bench.

I think

they're

in the b r i e f s , and I'll

to answer questions

on those.

One was there was a question
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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I

about

be

13

1

dismissing

2

whether under

3

be a suggestion

4

there was a question whether

5

suggestion

6

a party who had died.

the rule if someone dies

That
judge might

8

judge didn't

9

fifth amended

rule from

complaint.

hand

11

claimed was a suggestion

12

There's another

13

the Court

14

Section

15

mortuary

or the cemetary

16

money

trust.

17

the sell pre-need

19

a burial

20

maybe

21

statute

22

keep

23

dies

issue, and

in his

counsel

issue

that's

that

to keep

legal

that

is whether
require

75 percent

is cemetaries

for peace

the

of the

go out

So, they
of mind,

the public,

and

sell
and

in five or ten years, and

the

so they have to

in a trust.

The question

25

the

death.

funeral p r o g r a m s .

is to protect

applies

of

happens

plot or whatever

24

that defense

the

except a

have

of the Utah Code would

18

that money

in his hand

rule on, and

Now, what

somebody

issue on which

He didn't

the earlier pleading

22-4-1

there was a

the bench, but again,

have anything

could

and

record.

is sort of a legal

10

in

or not

is

there has to

of death on the record,

of death on the

7

The question

is whether

to this case, and
I think

I think

that

section

it is a legal

it's fairly well

covered
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by

the

14
1

briefs.

2

Now, the last issue, and I'll

3

quickly,

4

matter of law by dissolving

the class.

Originally

5

Judge Fishier had certified

the class.

Later

6

Dee decertified

He uncertified

7

class .

8
9

is whether

touch on it

or not Judge Dee errored as a

the class.

Although

Judge

the

the briefs are sketchy, we do

have in -- the Court did accept our appendix, and

10

our appendix

includes

the findings of fact by Judge

11

D e e , and

12

it.

13

that Judge Dee, as a matter of law, he used

14

wrong

the conclusions

of law when he

decertified

I can just quickly say in my minute

legal

15

rules when he decertified

First of all he, on the

remaining,
the

it.

numerosity

16

q u e s t i o n , one issue in a class action

is whether

17

the class

His test was

18

in the Conclusion of Law No. 1, since the names and

19

addresses

20

contract

21

class act ion•

22
23

is so n u m e r o u s , et cetera.

of individuals

signing

the same form of

are readily a v a i l a b l e , you can't have a

As a matter of law, that's
That's part of the test.

24

b r o a d e r , and since

25

test

The test

the wrong test.
is much

I don't have time, the complete

is in a Utah Supreme Court

case, Call
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versus

15

1

the City

of West

2

Jordan.

Again, Judge Dee used

3

because he said

4

Conclusion

5

class action

6

methods.

7

three alternative

the p l a i n t i f f s ,

of Law No. 3, had
is superior

That's

8
9

that

the wrong

You

11

but he basically

ruled

12

to qualify

23-B-3, and

but

15

wrong

16

to make

17

didn't

18

had been ruled

thing

I don't
of

that's

have time,

law you have

the class,

larger, and Judge Dee

on before, and
so

simply

he thought

it

hadn't.

19

Now,

20

THE COURT: We'll

give you a minute

22

MR. DeBRY: Thank

you.

23

MR. HENRIOD: May

it please

21

overtime,

it

over,

Judge Dee did

to enlarge

that

there

wrong.

-- that

that on the basis

I'm

are

qualify

-- if I can -- I'm

is there was a motion

hear

the rules,

as a matter

if I can take 15 seconds

the class

that a

there

can either

or B-2 or B-3, and

14

to prove

available

look at

under

The last

in his

test because

10

under

test

tests.

are three alternatives.

13

failed

to other

If the Court will

23-B-l

the wrong

I'll

-on

rebuttal.

24

Stephen Henroid.

25

Memorial

I represent

the

the Court,

respondent,

Estates.
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I'm

16

I think some clarification
in the lower court would be helpful
appellant's

a motion
summary

in light of the

In December

of 1987, the respondent

for summary

judgment.

judgment

completely

was argued

reviewed

motion

Judge Moffat

for

had

the file; had discussed

and the defendant;

his opinion

That

for both
and

the

the

indicated

the motion had merit, and

that he was prepared

filed

in January of 1988.

case extensively with counsel
plaintiff

on

argument.

At that argument,

of the

of what went

that

in

indicated

to rule on it to the

detriment

plaintiff.
The response

to acknowlege
primarily

that

that certain problems

because

this complaint

The principal
is that

had

was

arisen,

factual matter

in 1982.

alleged

both mausoleums had been

for the plaintiff

these issues by filing a new

As counsel

for the defendant,
The

prejudice, and instructed

said,

the motion

the plaintiff
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"Let

complaint."

I stipulated

judge denied

being

constructed.

me address

fine.

in it

been

and by the time this matter was

So, counsel

that was

made was

filed

the couple of mausoleums hadn't

constructed,
argued,

the plaintiff

that
without

that he had

17
1

20 days,

I believe,

2

complaint

THE COURT: That
motion

for summary

5
6

is to say he denied

judgment

motion

to

Instructed
issues and cut out

9

no

the plaintiff
those

longer pertinent,

items

and

prejudice?
the

to narrow

that were

the

obviously

to refiie, and we set a

schedule.

11

What

12

fifth amended

13

new

14

the other

causes remained

15

same

the plaintiff

16

trial

happened

a month

complaint

was

later was that

filed with five

causes of action, with no d e l e t i o n s .

time

the

totally

All of

in the matter, and at

asked

for an

the

expedited

setting.

17

The Court

18

counsel

19

available

20

held a p r e - t r i a l , at which

for the plaintiff

didn't

by telephone, and had

appear and wasn't
set

a schedule.

The schedule

said

that

that

the discovery

21

commence

on July 6th;

22

was June

10th, and

23

m o t i o n s was June

25

the

amend.

8

24

without

MR. HENRIOD: Yes, your Honor, not

7

10

amended

--

3
4

to file a fifth

that

day

would
cut-off

to file

16th, as I r e c a l l .

The defendant
interrogatories

the last

the trial

going

filed
into

a fourth set of

the new causes of
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18

action, which were significant

causes of action;

one

of

for

intentional

distress

and one based

plaintiff

claimed

she thought
her

the mausoleum

didn't

the
look the way

to look when she bought

1st,

interrogatories

answered

They weren't

answered

filed

hand-delivered
summary

of service

at the hearing
and

discovery

of an answer

on the motion

for dismissal

respond,

pursuant

was when

the motion was

to Rule

has

were

for

for failure

37, on June 21st,

to

which

heard.

trial only

two weeks

falls squarely within
Gardner

by the

was

in the case, although answers

judgment

With

answered.

10th.

No certificate
ever been

were never

by the due date, which

cut-off, which was June

WWB

that

contract.

They weren't

that

emotional

on the fact

it was going

Those

June

infliction

case, in which

later, I believe

the parameters

of

the

there also was no

two-step procedure, as referred

to by Judge Orme.

The reason was, with

new causes of

five brand

action and no response

to the discovery,

defendants were severely
motion

for summary

have been

prejudiced,

judgment

in the event

the

both in the

argument,

of a trial.
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and

would

19

1

Now,

the Rule 37-B dismissal

2

appealed

by the appellant

3

not

4

the reply brief, and stands.

5

this Court

6

matter.

addressed

7

in either

8

already

9

that

in this matter.

the appellant's

been addressed

point

in response

11

judgment

12

the affidavit

13

to the defendant's motion

of Erma

before

15

1987.

the Court

16

was hearing

18

extensive

heard

19

affidavits,

20

ruling

and

21

that

failed

to controvert

23

evidence

24

was no material

25

plaintiff

of the

line,

was

issue of
going

filed

in January

of

file and

made an

the

in any way weakens
it was

the appellant

which showed

fact, and

to be able

that

simply

that

into
there

the

to prevail
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the

made.

the facts which were put

by the defendant,

wasn't

thereof,

later, hadn't

the basis upon which

22

summary

Judge Moffat, when he

I do not believe

As a bottom

the Court

had been

the argument

the argument

re-reading

is

Schoney.

So, the fact

17

that

for

in support

Now, all of the affidavits

14

all

is -- has

by the Court, and

in the affidavits

or

this

the only matters which were before

10

It is

that's

to resolve

principal

been

brief

I believe

needs to consider

Our second

has not

upon

20

1

the evidence.

2

Now, in filing

their brief, they've

from depositions which were

quoted

3

extensively

4

filed, and have not to this day been filed, and

5

were not

lost by the lower

6

court.

This morning, in checking

the file before

7

the hearing, to my surprise

I found

8

of depositions have now been

filed

9

that were

filed

in October

10

filed

in May of 1988.

11

c o p i e s , and I would assume

12

files of the appellant

13

court.

of

Our brief was
unsigned

that they come from

They were not in the

Shearer

lower

in the past —

quoting

16

through Utah Department, found at 657 Pacific

17

1337 -- where the moving party's

18

material

19

party

20

he is presumably

21

should

22

issue of fact is p r e s e n t , nor would

23

at

is in itself

versus

I'm

State, by and
2nd

evidentiary

s u f f i c i e n t , and the opposing

fails to proffer any evidentiary matter
in a position

be justified

the

to Judge Moffat.

15

when

to do so, the Court

in concluding

that no genuine
one be present

trial.

24
25

the

in this court

These are all

As this Court has ruled
from

that a number

1988.

They were not available

14

never

Judge Moffat didn't have a burden to ask
where

the unfiled depositions

w e r e , and to get
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them

21
1

in front

2

simply

failed

3

in the

lower

4
5

of him and

issues

them.

8

analysis

9

taken

discovery

—

tell me again

the entry of default

13

appeal.

14

It's something

15

erroneously.

16

reply brief, which, as a matter

17

to all kinds of things

18

respondent's

19

looked

24
25

docketing

statement

It's not argued

for

your

been
at

the

that

the lower

It's not

brief.

it and

statement,

you

in the

as an issue on

in the appellant's
court

of

that weren't

to in the

fact,

find

replies

in the

That's my position.

I can't

brief.

did

even referred

THE COURT: It's not

I've

it.

in the

docketing

say?

MR. HENRIOD: It's not
statement

judgment

raised

appellan't

23

that,

sanction.

12

22

to

-- walk me through

MR. HENRIOD: It's not

20

issue

the

as to why no appeal has properly

from

11

on that

to a couple of

THE COURT: Before you get
Mr. Henroid,

plaintiff

court.

that have been raised

7

21

The

to (inaudible) burden

Now, with respect

6

10

review

in the

docketing

either.
Now, with

decertification,

respect

I think

to Judge

the Court

Dee's
should
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note

22

1

about a year after

the case was

2

Fishier certified

3

23.

4

contained

5

alleged

6

alleged a certain identity

7

that

8

based on their a l l e g a t i o n s , the judge

9

certified

Judge

it as a class action under

He did that based upon the
in the plaintiff's

sufficient

Rule

allegations

complaint.

They

members of the class.

they could properly

10

filed,

of issues.

represent

They

They

alleged

the group, and
properly

the case.
Two years thereafter, when the motion

to

11

decertify was made, it was made on the basis of

12

evidence.

13

findings of fact are in the record.

14

of fact specify

15

containing

16

all the parties entering

17

known; that the -- w e l l , the questions do not

18

predominate

19

Schoney's questions

20

issues as to what occurred

21

the

Judge Dee entered

that

there are only

the same terms;

over

findings of fact.
The

His

findings

27 agreements

that the identity

of

into those agreements

is

the group as a w h o l e , because
involved

for all

after

evidence

they entered

into

contract.

22

It seems to me that

23

on that particular

24

not part of the summary

25

dismissal

the appellant's

issue -- which
judgment

-- is to marshal

burden

is, of course,
or the Rule 37

the evidence
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in support

23

1

of Judge Dee's

2

clearly

findings, and

relevance.

3

addressed,

except

5

without

6

other

7

certification

8

regarding

9

appellant's

citations

fact,

to any authorities
on the actual

and the findings

decertification.
argument

The motion

has

findings

facts

order of
conclusions
the

by

so when you read

his

conclusions.

In the transcript

14

reply brief, he indicates

15

the motion

16

already addressed

17

which was

18

point

which
that

is quoted

the points made

to enlarge, were points
in the second

the complaint

before

in the

that

amended
the Court

in

were
complaint,
at

that

in time.

19

So, they weren't

20

different,

21

enlarging

22

and

they didn't

new,

they

for

the class.

him simultaneously

with

motion was before

the m o t i o n

MR. HENRIOD: Y e s , right,
both of

weren't

form a basis

THE COURT: W e l l , that

24
25

argument

to enlarge was considered

12

23

and

is not

to fail on that as well.

Judge Dee, and it is obviously

13

there was

or any

So, I think

11

and

that also

for some conclusionary

than the record

10

that

That has not been done.

As a matter of

4

to show

to

decertify?

and he ruled

them.
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on

24

1

THE COURT: I suspect

2

hadn't

explicitely

ruled

3

if you're decertifying

4

least, you have determined

that

on the motion

a class,
not

6

With respect

to the matters
could

to enlarge,

to enlarge

MR. HENRIOD: I suppose.

the Court

if he

implicitely

5

indicated

even

that

it.

Counsel

7

has

8

addressed

9

death on the record very simply was a suggestion

as a matter of law,

10

made

11

filed

12

response

13

the record.

14

death of Mr. Schoney, and

15

in the motion

for summary

in December

of 1987, and

ever

filed

properly

at

have

the suggestion of

judgment

which was

there was no

to the suggestion

of death on

Some 27 months had expired
there was no

since

the

substitution

made .

16

With respect

17

requires

18

form

19

entered

20

payments

21

75-percent

22

crypts.

23

contracts

24

1983.

25

time.

to Section

the 75-percent

that

trust,

22-4-1

that section

it existed at the time the

into the contract
under

and

the contract

trust

In fact,
in 1977.

the Schoneys

with

in the

parties

completed

did not

in connection

that

their

require

the

mausoleum

paid off

their

This statute was amended

Their money had all been paid before
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in
that

25

1

The amendment

inserted,

2

unconstructed

mausoleum

crypts,

3

niches

4

trust would

5

crypts, niches, cemetary burial

unconstructed

and markers as substantive areas where

6

apply; and deleted

In their brief,

7

the amendment

8

clarification

9

should

vaults,

relate

of the earlier

10

in the statute.

11

shouldn't

12

had been

It wasn't

relate back.

mausoleum

back,

argues
as

a

statute.
substantive

change

lastly,

both

It

mausoleums

constructed.
So, any argument

in trust

15

case was damaged,

16

mausoleums were constructed.

The mausoleums

17

been

has not had

18

damage.

in place.

23

simply

the appellant

doesn't work.

The plaintiff

like

in this
The
have

any

it.

THE COURT: Thank you.
to take another

21
22

Submit

therefore

the monies were not

put

20

and

that

14

19

that
mere

a clarification.

And

the

privileges.

the appellant

This was a significant

13

vaults,

Mr. DeBry,

if you'd

minute.

MR. DeBRY: Appreciate

it.

Thank you,

Taking

first, what

your

Honor.
the last point

24

Counsel, Mr. Henroid

25

The mausoleums

said about

had been

opposing

there's no damage.

finished,

that
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sounds a lot

26

like the transcript
really

arguing

agree with

in front

of Judge Dee.

his version of facts.

those

They're

We just

don't

facts.

The problem

is, that's his version of the

facts, and Judge Dee didn't

have any -- or Judge

Moffat

to look at.

think

didn't

have anything

judges should

basically

rule based

a proffer

We don't

on a proffer

of somebody's

--

version of the

facts .
Now,
appealed

the other question

the ruling,

sanction.

the dismissal

The answer

to that

of the appendix prepared
is the judge's order
he says
upon

failed

to respond

interrogatories."
that

—

in some detail,

the additional

for

discovery

is that at Exhibit I

by the respondent,

there

Judge Moffat's order, and
"Judgment

ground

that

should be entered

the plaintiff

to the defendant's
We specifically

has

fourth set of

appealed

from

order.
Now,

statement,

it may not be in the

because

I haven't

that

that was
presented

is one of the
locked

issues

from

that

for a
order,

that was in our brief

in the computer

to the Court

docketing

looked at that

while, but we certainly appealed
and

is whether we

that we would

in more detail
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have

if we had

27

1

been permitted

2

clear error

3

days

4

dismissal."

to file that b r i e f .

for a judge

to say

late on discovery,

5

that

Certainly

it is

if you're

15

that, q u o t e ,

"requires

Finally, I think our basic argument

6

that Judge Moffat didn't

7

him except

8

rule on summary

9

complicated

10

have anything

verbal a r g u m e n t , and

case based

on oral

Mr. DeBry,

12

of him

13

that point

the

that he had had all

in a

suggestion,

that stuff

in January and been over
in

shouldn't

argument.

THE COURT: What about

11

in front of

the Court

judgment, especially

in front

it thoroughly

MR. DeBRY: W e l l ,

15

THE COURT: I guess we're speculating
whether

17

several months
MR. DeBRY: And

that's a good

later

just simply

19

stretch, and

20

say,

21

really

22

to say,

23

week, he certainly must have

25

to comment

think that's a s t r e t c h .
it's basically

on it.

it."

read

Then

clear

that

that

or

this

it."
the motion was

the sDigitized
a m e ,by thewhy
did
a Law
new
o t i o n , and why
Howard W.
Hunter they
Law Library,file
J. Reuben Clark
School,mBYU.
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to

of the doubt

it today

read

I

That's a long

gives a lot of -- every benefit

If it was that

about

a lot of speculation

" W e l l , he must have read

"Well, if he didn't

question.

—

I want

18

24

at

time?

14

16

is

28

ll

did

they

file three new affidavits with

2

motion

3

hand,

4

affidavits,

5

oral argument

—

now, he didn't

he hadn't

6

then

read

have

on the old

have

action

8

couldn't

9

affidavits

10

relate

11

happy

12

in his

read

just asked

those
for

motion.

In fact, there were

7

that motion

it, and he hadn't

they should

their

five new causes of

that had been pleaded.

So, he

have read any of the fact
or interrogatories

to those five new fact
to answer questions, but

certainly

issues or

or depositions
issues.
I'm

I'll

overtime

that
be
now.

THE COURT: Thank you very much, Mr. DeBry

13

We'll

take the matter under

14

(Adjourned)

advisement

1 5I
16
17|
18
191
20
21
22
23

25
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STATE OF
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CERTIFICATE

UTAH
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I, Beverly Lowe, a Notary Public in and
for the State of Utah, do hereby certify:
That the foregoing proceedings were
transcribed under my direction from the electronic
tape recording made of these p r o c e e d i n g s .
That this transcript is full, true and
correct and contains all of the evidence, all of
the objections of Counsel and rulings of the Court
and all matters to which the same relate which were
audible through the said tape recording.
I further certify that I am not of kin or
otherwise associated with any of the parties to
said cause of action, and that I am not interested
in the outcome thereof.
That certain parties were not identified
in the record, and therefore the name associated
with the statement may not be the correct name as
to the speaker.

August,

WITNESS MY HAND AND
1990.

My commission expires
February 24, 1992

SEAL

this 30th day of

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing in Utah
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